



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

August 12, 2005

Ms. Amy Ferber
Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.
1001 Fannin Street, Suite 2300
Houston, Texas 77002-6760

OR2005-07327

Dear Ms. Ferber:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 229193.

Court Appointed Special Advocates of Brazoria County ("CASA"), which you represent, received a request for the personnel and employment records of a named employee, any grant reports submitted by CASA, a list of all volunteers, the applications and background information for those volunteers, and the screening methods and reports for volunteers. You state that you have released some of the requested information, but claim that a portion of the submitted information is not subject to the Act, and, alternatively, that the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.103, 552.130, and 552.137 of the Government Code. We have also considered comments submitted by the requestor. *See Gov't Code § 552.304* (providing that interested party may submit comments stating why information should or should not be released). We have considered your arguments and reviewed the submitted information.¹

Initially, we address your contention that some of the submitted information is not subject to the Act. You assert that the named position for which employment and personnel records are sought is not directly funded through public funds, and therefore does not constitute "public information" subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act. An entity that is supported in whole or in part by public funds or that spends public funds is a governmental body under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code

¹This letter ruling assumes that the submitted representative sample of information is truly representative of the requested information as a whole. This ruling neither reaches nor authorizes CASA to withhold any information that is substantially different from the submitted information. *See Gov't Code §§ 552.301(e)(1)(D), .302; Open Records Decision Nos. 499 at 6 (1988), 497 at 4 (1988).*

(“‘[g]overnmental body’ . . . means . . . the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds.”). Public funds are “funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state.” Gov’t Code § 552.003(5).

The Act requires a governmental body to make information that is within its possession or control available to the public, with certain statutory exceptions. *See* Gov’t Code §§ 552.002(a), .006, .021. Both the courts and this office previously have considered the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 488 U.S. 1042 (1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be “governmental bodies” that are subject to the Act “‘simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body.’” *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228 (quoting Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973)). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted that in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003, this office’s opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-821 (1987), *quoting* ORD-228 (1979). That same opinion informs that “a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a ‘governmental body.’” Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide “services traditionally provided by governmental bodies.” *Id.*

The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) and the Southwest Conference (the “SWC”), both of which received public funds, were not “governmental bodies” for purposes of the Act, because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. *See Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC were associations made up of both private and public universities. The NCAA and the SWC both received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *See id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *See id.* at 229-31. The

Kneeland court concluded that although the NCAA and the SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act, because the NCAA and SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds that they received from their member public institutions. *See id.* at 231; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic departments of private-school members of Southwest Conference did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *See id.* at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *See id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated that “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which have entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of the predecessor to section 552.003(1)(A)(xii).” *See id.* Accordingly, the commission was determined to be a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *See id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status under the Act of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”). The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *See* Open Records Decision No. 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *See id.* at 2. We noted that an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found that “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded that the DMA was a governmental body to the extent that it received the city’s financial support for

facilities and operations. *See id.* As such, the DMA's records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *See id.*

We note that the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3 (1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a "governmental body" under the Act. *See id.* at 4. For example, a contract or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will bring the private entity within the definition of a "governmental body" under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii). The overall nature of the relationship created by the contract is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *See id.*

You argue that the "funds CASA receives from the state are not used to support any portion of [the named employee's] position[.]" However, information submitted by both CASA and the requestor indicates that CASA receives funds from Texas CASA, which is a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *See* Gov't Code § 552.003. The submitted information also indicates that funds received from Texas CASA go to support the position at issue. Thus, the position at issue is funded, at least in part, through public funds. As such, the personnel and employment records related to the position are public information under the Act. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 602 at 5 (records related to parts of the Dallas Museum of Art directly supported by city subject to Act), 302 (1982) (finding Brazos County Industrial Foundation to be governmental body when it receives unrestricted grant from city); *see also* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 (1987) (receipt of public funds for general support of activities of private organization brings organization within definition of "governmental body").

We next consider your claim under section 552.103 of the Government Code, as it is potentially the broadest exception to disclosure. Section 552.103 provides as follows:

(a) Information is excepted from [required public disclosure] if it is information relating to litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party or to which an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision, as a consequence of the person's office or employment, is or may be a party.

...

(c) Information relating to litigation involving a governmental body or an officer or employee of a governmental body is excepted from disclosure under Subsection (a) only if the litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated

on the date that the requestor applies to the officer for public information for access to or duplication of the information.

Gov't Code § 552.103(a), (c). A governmental body has the burden of providing relevant facts and documents to show that the section 552.103(a) exception is applicable in a particular situation. The test for meeting this burden is a showing that (1) litigation was pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the governmental body received the request for information, and (2) the information at issue is related to that litigation. *Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found.*, 958 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.); *Heard v. Houston Post Co.*, 684 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 551 at 4 (1990). A governmental body must meet both prongs of this test for information to be excepted under section 552.103(a).

To establish that litigation is reasonably anticipated, a governmental body must provide this office “concrete evidence showing that the claim that litigation may ensue is more than mere conjecture.” Open Records Decision No. 452 at 4 (1986). Concrete evidence to support a claim that litigation is reasonably anticipated may include, for example, the governmental body’s receipt of a letter containing a specific threat to sue the governmental body from an attorney for a potential opposing party.² Open Records Decision No. 555 (1990); *see* Open Records Decision No. 518 at 5 (1989) (litigation must be “realistically contemplated”). On the other hand, this office has determined that if an individual publicly threatens to bring suit against a governmental body, but does not actually take objective steps toward filing suit, litigation is not reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 331 (1982). Further, the fact that a potential opposing party has hired an attorney who makes a request for information does not establish that litigation is reasonably anticipated. Open Records Decision No. 361 (1983).

You inform us that “CASA volunteers are currently involved in approximately sixty cases pending in Brazoria County District Court.” You also state that the “CASA volunteer is not a party to the case and serves as a neutral, independent person appointed to represent the best interests of the child.” Therefore, you acknowledge that CASA is not a party to any pending litigation. Furthermore, you have not demonstrated that CASA reasonably anticipated litigation when it received this request. *See* Gov’t Code § 552.103(a); Open Records Decision No. 575 at 2 (1990) (stating that predecessor to section 552.103 only applies when governmental body is party to litigation). Accordingly, CASA may not withhold any of the information at issue under section 552.103 of the Government Code.

²In addition, this office has concluded that litigation was reasonably anticipated when the potential opposing party took the following objective steps toward litigation: filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, *see* Open Records Decision No. 336 (1982); hired an attorney who made a demand for disputed payments and threatened to sue if the payments were not made promptly, *see* Open Records Decision No. 346 (1982); and threatened to sue on several occasions and hired an attorney, *see* Open Records Decision No. 288 (1981).

Next we address your argument that the identities of CASA's volunteers are excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 552.101 excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." In the opinion *In re Bay Area Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse*, 982 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1998), the Texas Supreme Court determined that the First Amendment right to freedom of association could protect an advocacy organization's list of contributors from compelled disclosure through a discovery request in pending litigation. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:

Freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is a fundamental liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment. *NAACP v. Alabama*, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). Compelled disclosure of the identities of an organization's members or contributors may have a chilling effect on the organization's contributors as well as on the organization's own activity. See *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). For this reason, the First Amendment requires that a compelling state interest be shown before a court may order disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in the advocacy of particular beliefs. *Tilton*, 869 S.W.2d at 956 (citing *NAACP*, 357 U.S. at 462-63, 78 S.Ct. 1163). "[I]t is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." *Id.*

Bay Area Citizens, 982 S.W.2d at 375-76 (footnote omitted). The court held that the party resisting disclosure bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that disclosure will burden First Amendment rights but noted that "the burden must be light." *Id.* at 376. Quoting the United State Supreme Court's decision in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976), the Texas court determined that the party resisting disclosure must show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." *Id.* Such proof may include "specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself." *Id.*

Considering the representations made to this office, the supporting information submitted, and the totality of the circumstances, we find that the disclosure of the identities of CASA's volunteers will burden their First Amendment rights of freedom of association. We further find that the term "contributor" encompasses the identities of volunteers who donate their time and services to CASA. Therefore, you must withhold the information that identifies volunteers under section 552.101 pursuant to the First Amendment right of association. We

emphasize that the information must be withheld on this basis only to the extent reasonable and necessary to protect the identity of the volunteers.

Turning to the remaining submitted information, the submitted documents include criminal history record information ("CHRI") that is confidential and not subject to disclosure. Section 552.101 also encompasses information protected by other statutes. Federal regulations prohibit the release of CHRI maintained in state and local CHRI systems to the general public. *See* 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(c)(1) ("Use of criminal history record information disseminated to noncriminal justice agencies shall be limited to the purpose for which it was given."), (2) ("No agency or individual shall confirm the existence or nonexistence of criminal history record information to any person or agency that would not be eligible to receive the information itself."). Section 411.083 provides that any CHRI maintained by the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") is confidential. Gov't Code § 411.083(a). Similarly, CHRI obtained from the DPS pursuant to statute is also confidential and may only be disclosed in very limited instances. *Id.* § 411.084; *see also id.* § 411.087 (restrictions on disclosure of CHRI obtained from DPS also apply to CHRI obtained from other criminal justice agencies). The CHRI in your possession falls within the ambit of these state and federal regulations. Therefore, you must withhold the CHRI we have marked from the requestor.

Section 552.101 also encompasses the doctrine of common law privacy. Common law privacy protects information if (1) the information contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) the information is not of legitimate concern to the public. *Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). The type of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation* include information relating to sexual assault, pregnancy, mental or physical abuse in the workplace, illegitimate children, psychiatric treatment of mental disorders, attempted suicide, and injuries to sexual organs. 540 S.W.2d at 683. This office has found that the following types of information are excepted from required public disclosure under or common law privacy: some kinds of medical information or information indicating disabilities or specific illnesses, *see* Open Records Decision Nos. 470 (1987) (illness from severe emotional and job-related stress), 455 (1987) (prescription drugs, illnesses, operations, and physical handicaps); personal financial information not relating to the financial transaction between an individual and a governmental body, *see* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 (1992), 545 (1990); and identities of victims of sexual abuse, *see* Open Records Decision Nos. 440 (1986), 393 (1983), 339 (1982). We have marked the information that is protected by the common law right to privacy.

We also note that the remaining submitted information includes an Employment Eligibility Verification Form, form I-9. Title 8, section 1324a of the United States Code, which is also encompassed by section 552.101, provides that this form "may not be used for purposes other than for enforcement of this chapter" and for enforcement of other federal statutes governing

crime and criminal investigations. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5); *see* 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(4). Release of this form under the Act would be “for purposes other than for enforcement” of the referenced federal statutes. Accordingly, we conclude that the I-9 form, which we have marked, is confidential and may only be released in compliance with the federal laws and regulations governing the employment verification system.

Section 552.117 may also be applicable to some of the submitted information. Section 552.117 excepts from disclosure the home addresses and telephone numbers, social security numbers, and family member information of current or former officials or employees of a governmental body who request that this information be kept confidential under section 552.024. Whether a particular piece of information is protected by section 552.117 must be determined at the time the request for it is made. *See* Open Records Decision No. 530 at 5 (1989). Therefore, CASA may only withhold information under section 552.117 on behalf of current or former officials or employees who made a request for confidentiality under section 552.024 prior to the date on which the request for this information was made. If the employee at issue timely elected to keep her personal information confidential, CASA must withhold this employee’s present and former home addresses and telephone numbers, social security number, and any information that reveals whether this employee has family members. CASA may not withhold this information under section 552.117 if the employee did not make a timely election to keep the information confidential. We have marked the information that may be subject to section 552.117.

Next, you note that the remaining submitted information contains Texas motor vehicle record information which is subject to section 552.130 of the Government Code. Section 552.130 excepts from disclosure information that “relates to . . . a motor vehicle operator’s or driver’s license or permit issued by an agency of this state [or] a motor vehicle title or registration issued by an agency of this state.” Gov’t Code § 552.130. In accordance with section 552.130 of the Government Code, CASA must withhold the Texas motor vehicle record information marked in the submitted documents.

You also note that the remaining submitted information contains insurance policy numbers. Section 552.136 of the Government Code states that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a credit card, debit card, charge card, or access device number that is collected, assembled, or maintained by or for a governmental body is confidential.” Gov’t Code § 552.136. CASA must, therefore, withhold the marked insurance policy numbers under section 552.136.

We note that the submitted information also contains e-mail addresses that are excepted from public disclosure under section 552.137 of the Government Code. Section 552.137 excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). *See* Gov’t Code § 552.137(a)-(c). Section 552.137 does not apply to a

government employee's work e-mail address because such an address is not that of the employee as a "member of the public" but is instead the address of the individual as a government employee. The e-mail addresses at issue do not appear to be of a type specifically excluded by section 552.137(c). You do not inform us that any member of the public to whom the e-mail addresses at issue pertain has affirmatively consented to the release of his or her e-mail address. CASA must, therefore, withhold the e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code.

Finally, we note that the remaining submitted information contains social security numbers. Section 552.147 of the Government Code³ provides that "[t]he social security number of a living person is excepted from" required public disclosure under the Act. Therefore, CASA must withhold the social security numbers we have marked in the submitted document under section 552.147.⁴

In summary: (1) CASA must withhold the information that identifies volunteers under section 552.101 pursuant to the First Amendment right of association; (2) CASA must withhold the marked CHRI in accordance with section 552.101 and the relevant state and federal regulations; (3) we have marked the information that is protected by the common law right to privacy and must be withheld under section 552.101; (4) the I-9 form, which we have marked, is confidential and may only be released in compliance with the federal laws and regulations governing the employment verification system; (5) we have marked the information that may be subject to section 552.117; (6) CASA must withhold the Texas motor vehicle record information marked in the submitted documents in accordance with section 552.130; (7) CASA must withhold the marked insurance policy numbers under section 552.136; (8) CASA must withhold e-mail addresses of members of the public under section 552.137; (9) CASA must withhold the social security numbers we have marked in the submitted document under section 552.147. The remaining submitted information must be released to the requestor.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular records at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other records or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For example, governmental bodies are prohibited from asking the attorney general to reconsider this ruling. Gov't Code § 552.301(f). If the

³Added by Act of May 23, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., S.B. 1485, § 1, sec. 552.147(a) (to be codified at Tex. Gov't Code § 552.147).

⁴We note that section 552.147(b) of the Government Code authorizes a governmental body to redact a living person's social security number from public release without the necessity of requesting a decision from this office under the Act.

governmental body wants to challenge this ruling, the governmental body must appeal by filing suit in Travis County within 30 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.324(b). In order to get the full benefit of such an appeal, the governmental body must file suit within 10 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.353(b)(3), (c). If the governmental body does not appeal this ruling and the governmental body does not comply with it, then both the requestor and the attorney general have the right to file suit against the governmental body to enforce this ruling. *Id.* § 552.321(a).

If this ruling requires the governmental body to release all or part of the requested information, the governmental body is responsible for taking the next step. Based on the statute, the attorney general expects that, upon receiving this ruling, the governmental body will either release the public records promptly pursuant to section 552.221(a) of the Government Code or file a lawsuit challenging this ruling pursuant to section 552.324 of the Government Code. If the governmental body fails to do one of these things, then the requestor should report that failure to the attorney general's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. The requestor may also file a complaint with the district or county attorney. *Id.* § 552.3215(e).

If this ruling requires or permits the governmental body to withhold all or some of the requested information, the requestor can appeal that decision by suing the governmental body. *Id.* § 552.321(a); *Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ).

Please remember that under the Act the release of information triggers certain procedures for costs and charges to the requestor. If records are released in compliance with this ruling, be sure that all charges for the information are at or below the legal amounts. Questions or complaints about over-charging must be directed to Hadassah Schloss at the Texas Building and Procurement Commission at (512) 475-2497.

If the governmental body, the requestor, or any other person has questions or comments about this ruling, they may contact our office. We note that a third party may challenge this ruling by filing suit seeking to withhold information from a requestor. Gov't Code § 552.325. Although there is no statutory deadline for contacting us, the attorney general prefers to receive any comments within 10 calendar days of the date of this ruling.

Sincerely,



José Vela III
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

JV/seg

Ref: ID# 229193

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Ms. Jeri Yenne
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