



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

June 30, 2006

Ms. Bernadette Gonzalez
Staff Attorney
Fort Bend Independent School District
P.O. Box 1004
Sugar Land, Texas 77487-1004

OR2006-07031

Dear Ms. Gonzalez:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 253020.

The Fort Bend Independent School District (the "district") received two requests for all correspondence between two named individuals from March 28, 2006 to April 2, 2006. You state that you will provide the requestors with a portion of the requested information. However, you claim that the remaining requested information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.103, 552.107, 552.109, and 552.137 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. This section encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy. Section 552.109 excepts from public disclosure "[p]rivate correspondence or communications of an elected office holder relating to matters the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of privacy[.]" Gov't Code § 552.109. This office has held that the test to be applied to information under section 552.109 is the same as the test formulated by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation v. Texas Industrial Accident Board*, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), for information claimed to be protected under the doctrine of common-law privacy

as incorporated by section 552.101. We will therefore consider your claims regarding common-law privacy under section 552.101 together with your claim under section 552.109.

In *Industrial Foundation*, the Texas Supreme Court held that information is protected by common-law privacy if it: (1) contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person; and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. *Id.* at 685. The type of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation* included information relating to sexual assault, pregnancy, mental or physical abuse in the workplace, illegitimate children, psychiatric treatment of mental disorders, attempted suicide, and injuries to sexual organs. 540 S.W.2d at 683. Having reviewed your arguments and the submitted information, we find that none of the information at issue is protected by common-law privacy. Therefore, none of the submitted information may be withheld under either section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy or under section 552.109.

Section 552.103 provides in part:

(a) Information is excepted from [required public disclosure] if it is information relating to litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party or to which an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision, as a consequence of the person's office or employment, is or may be a party.

...

(c) Information relating to litigation involving a governmental body or an officer or employee of a governmental body is excepted from disclosure under Subsection (a) only if the litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date that the requestor applies to the officer for public information for access to or duplication of the information.

Gov't Code § 552.103(a), (c). A governmental body has the burden of providing relevant facts and documents to show that the section 552.103(a) exception is applicable in a particular situation. The test for meeting this burden is a showing that (1) litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the governmental body receives the request for information, and (2) the information at issue is related to that litigation. *Thomas v. Cornyn*, 71 S.W.3d 473, 487 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); *Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found.*, 958 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.); *Heard v. Houston Post Co.*, 684 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 551 at 4 (1990). The governmental body must meet both prongs of this test for information to be excepted under section 552.103(a).

The question of whether litigation is reasonably anticipated must be determined on a case-by-case basis. *See* Open Records Decision No. 452 at 4 (1986). To establish that litigation is reasonably anticipated, a governmental body must provide this office with “concrete evidence showing that the claim that litigation may ensue is more than mere conjecture.” *Id.* Concrete evidence to support a claim that litigation is reasonably anticipated may include, for example, the governmental body’s receipt of a letter containing a specific threat to sue the governmental body from an attorney for a potential opposing party.¹ Open Records Decision No. 555 (1990); *see* Open Records Decision No. 518 at 5 (1989) (litigation must be “realistically contemplated”). On the other hand, this office has determined that if an individual publicly threatens to bring suit against a governmental body, but does not actually take objective steps toward filing suit, litigation is not reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 331 (1982).

In this instance, you indicate that an attorney for a vendor to the district sent a letter to a board member outlining the vendor’s claims against the board member and making certain demands for relief. You have provided us with no evidence that the district anticipated litigation on the date the present request was received. Therefore, based on our review of the arguments and the submitted information, we conclude the district has not established that it reasonably anticipated litigation on the date the district received the present request for information. Accordingly, the district may not withhold the submitted information under section 552.103 of the Government Code.

Section 552.107 of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. Gov’t Code § 552.107. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002).

First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in capacity other than that of attorney).

¹ In addition, this office has concluded that litigation was reasonably anticipated when the potential opposing party took the following objective steps toward litigation: filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, *see* Open Records Decision No. 336 (1982); hired an attorney who made a demand for disputed payments and threatened to sue if the payments were not made promptly, *see* Open Records Decision No. 346 (1982); and threatened to sue on several occasions and hired an attorney, *see* Open Records Decision No. 288 (1981).

Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Finally, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5).

Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You state that a portion of the submitted information constitutes confidential attorney-client communications between an attorney representing the district’s board of trustees and the district’s board of trustees. You further contend that these communications were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services and were intended to be confidential. Having considered these representations and the information at issue, we find that the district has established that the communication we have marked constitutes a privileged attorney-client communication that may be withheld pursuant to section 552.107 of the Government Code. However, the district has failed to demonstrate that the remaining information at issue constitutes a communication between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, or lawyer representatives. Therefore, the district may not withhold any of the remaining information under section 552.107(1). *See Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-11 (2002)* (delineating demonstration required of governmental body that claims attorney-client privilege under section 552.107(1)).

Finally, we address your claim that some of the e-mail addresses contained in the submitted documents are subject to section 552.137 of the Government Code. Section 552.137 excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). *See Gov’t Code § 552.137(a)-(c)*. The e-mail addresses you have marked are not of the type specifically excluded by section 552.137(c). Therefore, unless the individuals

at issue consented to the release of their e-mail addresses, the district must withhold them in accordance with section 552.137 of the Government Code.

In summary, the district must withhold the e-mail addresses you have marked pursuant to section 552.137 of the Government Code unless their owners have affirmatively consented to their release. The district may withhold the information marked under section 552.107 of the Government Code. The remaining submitted information must be released to the requestors.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular records at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other records or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For example, governmental bodies are prohibited from asking the attorney general to reconsider this ruling. Gov't Code § 552.301(f). If the governmental body wants to challenge this ruling, the governmental body must appeal by filing suit in Travis County within 30 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.324(b). In order to get the full benefit of such an appeal, the governmental body must file suit within 10 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.353(b)(3), (c). If the governmental body does not appeal this ruling and the governmental body does not comply with it, then both the requestor and the attorney general have the right to file suit against the governmental body to enforce this ruling. *Id.* § 552.321(a).

If this ruling requires the governmental body to release all or part of the requested information, the governmental body is responsible for taking the next step. Based on the statute, the attorney general expects that, upon receiving this ruling, the governmental body will either release the public records promptly pursuant to section 552.221(a) of the Government Code or file a lawsuit challenging this ruling pursuant to section 552.324 of the Government Code. If the governmental body fails to do one of these things, then the requestor should report that failure to the attorney general's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. The requestor may also file a complaint with the district or county attorney. *Id.* § 552.3215(e).

If this ruling requires or permits the governmental body to withhold all or some of the requested information, the requestor can appeal that decision by suing the governmental body. *Id.* § 552.321(a); *Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ).

Please remember that under the Act the release of information triggers certain procedures for costs and charges to the requestor. If records are released in compliance with this ruling, be sure that all charges for the information are at or below the legal amounts. Questions or

complaints about over-charging must be directed to Hadassah Schloss at the Office of the Attorney General at (512) 475-2497.

If the governmental body, the requestor, or any other person has questions or comments about this ruling, they may contact our office. Although there is no statutory deadline for contacting us, the attorney general prefers to receive any comments within 10 calendar days of the date of this ruling.

Sincerely,



Anne Prentice
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

AP/sdk

Ref: ID# 253020

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Ms. Susan Johnston
1131 Cardinal Avenue
Sugar Land, Texas 77478
(w/o enclosures)

Ms. Bev Carter
c/o Fort Bend Star
869 Dulles, Suite C
Stafford, Texas 77477
(w/o enclosures)