



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS  
GREG ABBOTT

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Ms. Candice M. De La Garza  
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OR2007-15818

Dear Ms. De La Garza:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 295942.

The Houston Police Department (the "department") received two requests for information from the same requestor pertaining to two incident reports. You claim that the requested information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.108, 552.130, and 552.147 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.108(a) of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "[i]nformation held by a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that deals with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime . . . if: (1) release of the information would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime." Gov't Code § 552.108(a)(1). Generally, a governmental body claiming section 552.108 must reasonably explain how and why the release of the requested information would interfere with law enforcement. *See id.* §§ 552.108(a)(1), (b)(1), .301(e)(1)(A); *see also Ex parte Pruitt*, 551 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977). You inform us that incident report number 112773907 relates to an ongoing criminal investigation. Based on your representations, we conclude that the release of this information would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime. *See Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. City of Houston*, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975), *writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam*, 536 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1976) (court delineates law enforcement interests that are present in active cases). Thus, section 552.108(a)(1) is applicable to incident report number 112773907.

Section 552.108(a)(2) excepts from disclosure “[i]nformation held by a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that deals with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime . . . if . . . it is information that deals with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime only in relation to an investigation that did not result in conviction or deferred adjudication[.]” Gov’t Code §552.108(a)(2). You state that incident report number 113036507 relates to a criminal investigation that has concluded in a result other than conviction or deferred adjudication. Based on your representation and our review of the information at issue, we conclude that section 552.108(a)(2) is applicable to incident report number 113036507.<sup>1</sup>

We note, however, that the requestor asserts a right of access to the submitted information under federal law. Such a right of access, if applicable, would preempt the protection afforded by section 552.108 of the Government Code. *See* U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); *Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Black*, 116 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. 2003) (discussing federal preemption of state law). In this instance, the requestor is a representative for Advocacy, Inc. (“Advocacy”), which has been designated as the state’s protection and advocacy system (“P&A system”) for purposes of the federal Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (“PAIMI Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (“DDA Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act (“PAIR Act”), 29 U.S.C. §794e. *See* Tex. Gov. Exec. Order No. DB-33, 2 Tex. Reg. 3713 (1977); Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 (2002); *see also* 42 CFR §§ 51.2 (defining “designated official” and requiring official to designate agency to be accountable for funds of P&A agency), 51.22 (requiring P&A agency to have a governing authority responsible for control).

The PAIMI Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system “shall . . . have access to all records of . . . any individual who is a client of the system if such individual . . . has authorized the system to have such access[.]” 42 U.S.C § 10805(a)(4)(A). The term “records” as used in the above-quoted provision

includes reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment [to the individual] or reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning records.

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<sup>1</sup>We note that section 552.108 does not except basic information about an arrested person, an arrest, or a crime. Gov’t Code § 552.108(c). Basic information refers to the information held to be public in *Houston Chronicle*. *See* 531 S.W.2d at 186-87.

*Id.* § 10806(b)(3)(A).

The DDA Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system, shall

(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred;

...

(I) have access to all records of –

(i) any individual with a developmental disability who is a client of the system if such individual, or the legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative of such individual, has authorized the system to have such access[.]

(J)

(i) have access to the records of individuals described in subparagraphs (B) and (I), and other records that are relevant to conducting an investigation, under the circumstances described in those subparagraphs, not later than 3 business days after the [P&A system] makes a written request for the records involved[.]

42 U.S.C § 15043(a)(2)(B), (I)(i), (J)(i). The DDA Act states that the term “record” includes

(1) a report prepared or received by any staff at any location at which services, supports, or other assistance is provided to individuals with developmental disabilities;

(2) a report prepared by an agency or staff person charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse or neglect, injury, or death occurring at such location, that describes such incidents and the steps taken to investigate such incidents; and

(3) a discharge planning record.

*Id.* § 15043(c). The PAIR Act provides, in relevant part, that a P & A system will “have the same . . . access to records and program income, as are set forth in [the DDA Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 794e (f)(2).

The PAIMI Act and the DDA Act grant a P&A system, under certain circumstances, access to “records.” Each of the acts has a separate, but similar, definition of “records.” The

principle issue which we must address in this instance is whether the submitted information constitutes a “record” under either of those acts. In this instance, the submitted information consists of criminal law enforcement investigations that are being utilized for law enforcement purposes. We note that the submitted information is not among the information specifically listed as a “record” in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c).

Advocacy notes, however, that the information listed in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) was not meant to be an exhaustive list.<sup>2</sup> Advocacy contends that it was Congress’s intent to grant a P&A system access to any and all information that the system deems necessary to conduct an investigation under the PAIMI Act and/or the DDA Act. We disagree. By the statutes’ plain language, access is limited to “records.” *See In re M&S Grading, Inc.*, 457 F.3d 898, 901 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (analysis of a statute must begin with the plain language). While we agree that the two definitions of “records” are not limited to the information specifically enumerated in those clauses, we do not believe that Congress intended for the definitions to be so expansive as to grant a P&A system access to any information it deems necessary. Such a reading of the statutes would render sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) insignificant. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (statute should be construed in a way that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant). Furthermore, in light of Congress’s evident preference for limiting the scope of access, we are unwilling to assume that Congress meant more than it said in enacting the PAIMI Act and the DDA Act. *See Kofa v INS*, 60 F.3d 1084 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (stating that statutory construction must begin with language of statute; to do otherwise would assume that Congress does not express its intent in words of statutes, but only by way of legislative history); *see generally Coast Alliance v. Babbitt*, 6 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that if, in following Congress’s plain language in statute, agency cannot carry out Congress’s intent, remedy is not to distort or ignore Congress’s words, but rather to ask Congress to address problem).

Based on the above analysis, we believe that the information specifically enumerated in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) is indicative of the types of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. *See Penn. Protection & Advocacy Inc. v. Houstoun*, 228 F.3d 423, 426 n.1 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is clear that the definition of “records” in § 10806 controls the types of records to which [the P&A agency] ‘shall have access’ under § 10805[.]”) As previously noted, the submitted information is not among the information specifically listed as “records” in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c). Furthermore, we find that the submitted information is not the type of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. Accordingly, we find that Advocacy does not have a right of access to the submitted information under either the PAIMI Act or the DDA Act.

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<sup>2</sup>Use of the term “includes” in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) of title 42 of the United States Code indicates that the definitions of “records” are not limited to the information specifically listed in those sections. *See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 78 F.3d 202 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41.

Advocacy argues that it has a right of access under the PAIR Act to the information at issue. We understand Advocacy to assert that the PAIR program provides it access to information to the same extent as the DDA Act and the PAAMII Act. As noted above, we have concluded that neither the PAMII Act nor the DDA Act apply to the records at issue. Accordingly, we have no basis for finding that Advocacy has a right of access to the records at issue by virtue of the PAIR program. We therefore conclude that, with the exception of basic information, which you state you have released, the department may withhold the submitted information under section 552.108 of the Government Code.

However, you claim that certain basic information in incident report number 112773907 is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. Section 552.101 excepts from disclosure “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses the doctrine of common law privacy, which protects information if (1) the information contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) the information is not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). The type of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation* included information relating to sexual assault, pregnancy, mental or physical abuse in the workplace, illegitimate children, psychiatric treatment of mental disorders, attempted suicide, and injuries to sexual organs. *Id.* at 683. However, because “the right of privacy is purely personal,” that right “terminates upon the death of the person whose privacy is invaded.” *Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enters., Inc.*, 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also *Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp.*, 472 F. Supp. 145, 146-47 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (“action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded”) (quoting Restatement of Torts 2d); See Attorney General Opinions JM-229 (1984) (“the right of privacy lapses upon death”), H-917 (1976) (“We are . . . of the opinion that the Texas courts would follow the almost uniform rule of other jurisdictions that the right of privacy lapses upon death.”); Open Records Decision No. 272 (1981) (“the right of privacy is personal and lapses upon death”). The information at issue pertains to a deceased individual. Accordingly, none of the basic information in incident report number 112773907 is protected by common law privacy.

In summary, with the exception of basic information, the submitted information may be withheld under section 552.108 of the Government Code. As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address your remaining arguments against disclosure.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular records at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other records or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For example, governmental bodies are prohibited

from asking the attorney general to reconsider this ruling. Gov't Code § 552.301(f). If the governmental body wants to challenge this ruling, the governmental body must appeal by filing suit in Travis County within 30 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.324(b). In order to get the full benefit of such an appeal, the governmental body must file suit within 10 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.353(b)(3), (c). If the governmental body does not appeal this ruling and the governmental body does not comply with it, then both the requestor and the attorney general have the right to file suit against the governmental body to enforce this ruling. *Id.* § 552.321(a).


If this ruling requires the governmental body to release all or part of the requested information, the governmental body is responsible for taking the next step. Based on the statute, the attorney general expects that, upon receiving this ruling, the governmental body will either release the public records promptly pursuant to section 552.221(a) of the Government Code or file a lawsuit challenging this ruling pursuant to section 552.324 of the Government Code. If the governmental body fails to do one of these things, then the requestor should report that failure to the attorney general's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. The requestor may also file a complaint with the district or county attorney. *Id.* § 552.3215(e).

If this ruling requires or permits the governmental body to withhold all or some of the requested information, the requestor can appeal that decision by suing the governmental body. *Id.* § 552.321(a); *Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ).

Please remember that under the Act the release of information triggers certain procedures for costs and charges to the requestor. If records are released in compliance with this ruling, be sure that all charges for the information are at or below the legal amounts. Questions or complaints about over-charging must be directed to Hadassah Schloss at the Office of the Attorney General at (512) 475-2497.

If the governmental body, the requestor, or any other person has questions or comments about this ruling, they may contact our office. Although there is no statutory deadline for contacting us, the attorney general prefers to receive any comments within 10 calendar days of the date of this ruling.

Sincerely,



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Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

JM/mcf

Ref: ID# 295942

Enc. Submitted documents

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