



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS  
GREG ABBOTT

March 7, 2008

Mr. Gaines West  
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OR2008-03149

Dear Mr. West:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 304102.

The Arts Council of the Brazos Valley (the "council"), which you represent, received a request for nine categories of information relating to the council's financial activities.<sup>1</sup> You ask whether the council is subject to the Act. In the event the council is subject to the Act, you claim that the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.103, and 552.108 of the Government Code and privileged under Texas Rule of Evidence 503. We have considered your arguments and reviewed the submitted information.

Initially, you ask this office whether the council is a governmental body, and therefore subject to the Act. Under the Act, the term "governmental body" includes several enumerated kinds of entities and "the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds[.]" Gov't Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). The phrase "public funds" means funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state. *Id.* § 552.003(5).

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<sup>1</sup>We note you have clarified with the requestor that she has not withdrawn any portion of her request. See Gov't Code § 552.222(b) (stating that if information requested is unclear, governmental body may ask requestor to clarify or narrow request).

Both the courts and this office previously have considered the scope of the definition of "governmental body" under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be "governmental bodies" that are subject to the Act "simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body." *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228; see Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted that in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office's opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes "a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser." Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-821 (1987), quoting ORD-228 (1979). That same opinion informs that "a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a 'governmental body.'" Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide "services traditionally provided by governmental bodies."

*Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228. The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA") and the Southwest Conference (the "SWC"), both of which received public funds, were not "governmental bodies" for purposes of the Act because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. See *id.* at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC were associations made up of both private and public universities. Both the NCAA and the SWC received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-31. The *Kneeland* court concluded that although the NCAA and the SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a "governmental body" for purposes of the Act, because the NCAA and SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided "specific and gaugeable services" in return for the funds that they received from their member public institutions. See *id.* at 231; see also *A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic

departments of private-school members of SWC did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of "governmental body" under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the "commission"), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. See ORD 288 at 1. The commission's contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to "[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City's interests and activities." *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated that "[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which have entered into the contract in the position of 'supporting' the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of [the predecessor to section 552.003]." *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was determined to be a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status of the Dallas Museum of Art (the "DMA") under the Act. The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. See Open Records Decision No. 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted that an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity's relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes "a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser." *Id.* at 4. We found that "the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable." *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded that the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent that it received the city's financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA's records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.*

You explain that the council is a non-profit organization which serves the Brazos Valley area through various programs, grants and services. You inform us that the council "receives a significant amount of its funding from public sources, including grants of money from the

City of College Station, Texas.” Accordingly, we conclude that the council is supported by public funding within the meaning of section 552.003 of the Government Code. *See* ORD 228. Therefore, we find that the council is a governmental body subject to the Act.

Next, we note that you have redacted large portions of the submitted information. Pursuant to section 552.301 of the Government Code, a governmental body that seeks to withhold requested information must submit to this office a copy of the information, labeled to indicate which exceptions apply to which parts of the copy, unless the governmental body has received a previous determination for the information at issue. Gov’t Code §§ 552.301(a), .301(e)(1)(D). You do not assert, nor does our review of our records indicate, that you have been authorized to withhold any of the redacted information without seeking a ruling from this office. *See id.* § 552.301(a); Open Records Decision No. 673 (2000). As such, these types of information must be submitted in a manner that enables this office to determine whether the information comes within the scope of an exception to disclosure. In this instance, we can discern the nature of a small portion of the redacted information; thus, being deprived of that information does not inhibit our ability to make a ruling. In the future, however, the council should refrain from redacting any information that it submits to this office in seeking an open records ruling. For the redacted information that we are unable to discern, the council has failed to comply with section 552.301, and such information is presumed public under section 552.302. *See* Gov’t Code §§ 552.301(e)(1)(D), .302. Thus, we conclude that the council must release the remaining redacted information to the requestor. If you believe that the remaining redacted information is confidential and may not lawfully be released, you must challenge this ruling in court as outlined below.

Next, we note that the submitted information is subject to section 552.022 of the Government Code. Section 552.022(a) provides in part:

(a) the following categories of information are public information and not excepted from required disclosure under this chapter unless they are expressly confidential under other law:

...

(2) the name, sex, ethnicity, salary, title, and dates of employment of each employee and officer of a governmental body;

(3) information in an account, voucher, or contract relating to the receipt or expenditure of public or other funds by a governmental body[.]

Gov’t Code § 552.022(a)(2), (3). Exhibit 9 is subject to section 552.022(a)(2). Further, the remaining information constitutes information relating to the receipt or expenditure of public

funds by a governmental body. The council must release this information unless it is expressly confidential under other law. You claim that the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.103 and 552.108 of the Government Code. We note that sections 552.103 and 552.108 are discretionary exceptions that protect the governmental body's interests and may be waived. *See Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Dallas Morning News*, 4 S.W.3d 469, 475-76 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.) (governmental body may waive section 552.103); Open Records Decision No. 542 at 4 (1990) (statutory predecessor to section 552.103 may be waived); Open Records Decision No. 177 at 3 (1977) (statutory predecessor to section 552.108 subject to waiver). As such, the council may not withhold the submitted information under sections 552.103 and 552.108. However, the Texas Supreme Court has held that the Texas Rules of Evidence are "other law" within the meaning of section 552.022. *See In re City of Georgetown*, 53 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. 2001); *see also* Open Records Decision Nos. 677 (2002), 676 (2002). Accordingly, we will address your attorney-client argument under Texas Rule of Evidence 503. Further, because information subject to section 552.022 may be withheld under section 552.101, we will address this exception.

Section 552.101 excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. This section encompasses information protected by other statutes. You raise section 30.006(c)(2) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides:

(c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), a court in a civil action may not order discovery from a nonparty law enforcement agency of information, records, documents, evidentiary materials, and tangible things if:

...

(2) the release of the information, records, documents, evidentiary materials, or tangible things would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of criminal acts.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 30.006(c)(2). Section 30.006(c)(2) applies only to a court and records held by a law enforcement agency. *See id.* The information at issue in this instance has been created and maintained by the council. Accordingly, we find that section 30.006(c)(2) is not applicable, and no portion of the information may be withheld on that basis.

You next claim that the information contained in Exhibits 9 and 10 is exempt from disclosure under section 552.101. As previously noted, this exception encompasses information that is considered to be confidential under constitutional, statutory, or decisional law. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 at 4 (1992) (constitutional privacy), 478 at 2 (1987) (statutory confidentiality), 611 at 1 (1992) (common-law privacy). You have not

directed our attention to any law under which any of the submitted information is considered to be confidential for the purposes of section 552.101. We therefore conclude that the council may not withhold any of the submitted information under section 552.101 of the Government Code.

In regard to the information in Exhibit 10, you raise Texas Rule of Evidence 503. Texas Rule of Evidence 503 enacts the attorney-client privilege. Rule 503(b)(1) provides as follows:

A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client:

(A) between the client or a representative of the client and the client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer;

(B) between the lawyer and the lawyer's representative;

(C) by the client or a representative of the client, or the client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer, to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein;

(D) between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client; or

(E) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client.

TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. *Id.* 503(a)(5).

Thus, in order to withhold attorney-client privileged information from disclosure under rule 503, a governmental body must: (1) show that the document is a communication transmitted between privileged parties or reveals a confidential communication; (2) identify the parties involved in the communication; and (3) show that the communication is confidential by explaining that it was not intended to be disclosed to third persons and that it was made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client. Upon a demonstration of all three factors, the information is privileged and confidential under rule 503, provided the client has not waived the privilege or the document does not fall within the purview of the exceptions to the privilege enumerated in rule 503(d). *Pittsburgh*

*Corning Corp. v. Caldwell*, 861 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).

We find that the council has failed to demonstrate how the information constitutes confidential communications between privileged parties made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services. Accordingly, the information in Exhibit 10 may not be withheld on this basis.

Finally, we note that the submitted information contains an account number.<sup>2</sup> Section 552.136 states in part that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of [the Act], a credit card, debit card, charge card, or access device number that is collected, assembled, or maintained by or for a governmental body is confidential.” Gov’t Code § 552.136. The council must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.136 of the Government Code.

In summary, the council must withhold the account number we have marked under section 552.136. The remaining information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular records at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other records or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For example, governmental bodies are prohibited from asking the attorney general to reconsider this ruling. Gov’t Code § 552.301(f). If the governmental body wants to challenge this ruling, the governmental body must file suit in Travis County within 30 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.324(b). In order to get the full benefit of such a challenge, the governmental body must file suit within 10 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.353(b)(3), (c). If the governmental body does not appeal this ruling and the governmental body does not comply with it, then both the requestor and the attorney general have the right to file suit against the governmental body to enforce this ruling. *Id.* § 552.321(a).

If this ruling requires the governmental body to release all or part of the requested information, the governmental body is responsible for taking the next step. Based on the statute, the attorney general expects that, upon receiving this ruling, the governmental body will either release the public records promptly pursuant to section 552.221(a) of the Government Code or file a lawsuit challenging this ruling pursuant to section 552.324 of the Government Code. If the governmental body fails to do one of these things, then the

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<sup>2</sup>The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception, such as section 552.136, on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. See Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

requestor should report that failure to the attorney general's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. The requestor may also file a complaint with the district or county attorney. *Id.* § 552.3215(e).

If this ruling requires or permits the governmental body to withhold all or some of the requested information, the requestor can challenge that decision by suing the governmental body. *Id.* § 552.321(a); *Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ).

Please remember that under the Act the release of information triggers certain procedures for costs and charges to the requestor. If records are released in compliance with this ruling, be sure that all charges for the information are at or below the legal amounts. Questions or complaints about over-charging must be directed to Hadassah Schloss at the Office of the Attorney General at (512) 475-2497.

If the governmental body, the requestor, or any other person has questions or comments about this ruling, they may contact our office. Although there is no statutory deadline for contacting us, the attorney general prefers to receive any comments within 10 calendar days of the date of this ruling.

Sincerely,



Chris Schulz  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

CS/jb

Ref: ID# 304102

Enc. Submitted documents

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(w/o enclosures)