



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

August 4, 2009

Mr. Dick Gregg
Gregg & Gregg
16055 Space Center Boulevard, Suite 150
Houston, Texas 77062

OR2009-10766

Dear Mr. Gregg:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 351002.

The City of South Houston (the "city"), which you represent, received a request for all correspondence from any entity that sought the requestor's attendance at a specified city council meeting. The city claims that the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.103, 552.107, and 552.111 of the Government Code.¹ We have considered the exceptions the city claims and reviewed the submitted information.

The city argues the submitted information is not subject to the Act. The Act is only applicable to "public information." *See* Gov't Code § 552.021. Section 552.002(a) defines public information as "information that is collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business: (1) by a governmental body; or (2) for a governmental body and the governmental body owns the information or has a right of access to it." *Id.* § 552.002(a). Upon review of the submitted information, we determine that the e-mail communications at issue were sent to a city employee from an attorney representing the city, and that the content of the communications pertains to the

¹The city also claims the submitted information is protected under the attorney-client privilege based on Texas Rule of Evidence 503 and under the attorney work product privilege based on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5. In this instance, however, the information is properly addressed here under section 552.107, rather than rule 503, and section 552.111, rather than rule 192.5. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 3 (2002).

transaction of official city business. Consequently, the submitted information constitutes "public information" as defined by section 552.002(a) and is subject to the Act.

We will now address the city's arguments against disclosure of the submitted information. Section 552.103 of the Government Code provides in part:

(a) Information is excepted from [required public disclosure] if it is information relating to litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party or to which an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision, as a consequence of the person's office or employment, is or may be a party.

...

(c) Information relating to litigation involving a governmental body or an officer or employee of a governmental body is excepted from disclosure under Subsection (a) only if the litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date that the requestor applies to the officer for public information for access to or duplication of the information.

Gov't Code § 552.103(a), (c). The city has the burden of providing relevant facts and documents to show that the section 552.103(a) exception is applicable in a particular situation. The test for meeting this burden is a showing that (1) litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the city received the request for information, and (2) the information at issue is related to that litigation. *Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found.*, 958 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.); *Heard v. Houston Post Co.*, 684 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 551 at 4 (1990). The city must meet both prongs of this test for information to be excepted under section 552.103(a).

The question of whether litigation is reasonably anticipated must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Open Records Decision No. 452 at 4 (1986). The city states that the requestor filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") prior to the date of the city's receipt of the present request for information. This office has found that a pending EEOC complaint indicates that litigation is reasonably anticipated. See Open Records Decision Nos. 386 at 2 (1983), 336 at 1 (1982). However, the city acknowledges that it settled the EEOC claim with the requestor prior to the receipt of the present request for information. Nevertheless, the city informs us that on the day after the city received the present request, the requestor's EEOC representative threatened the city with further litigation. However, because the EEOC claim was already settled, and because the further threat of litigation did not arise until after the city received the present request for information, we determine that litigation was neither pending nor reasonably anticipated on

the date the city received the request for information. Therefore, the city may not withhold any of the submitted information under section 552.103 of the Government Code.

Next, section 552.107(1) protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services" to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was "not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication." *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

The city claims the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege provided by section 552.107 of the Government Code. Upon review, we find that you have failed to demonstrate how any of the submitted information constitutes confidential communications between privileged parties made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services. Therefore, the city may not withhold any of the submitted information under section 552.107 of the Government Code.

The city further claims the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.111 of the Government Code. Section 552.111 excepts from disclosure "an interagency or intraagency memorandum or letter that would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency." This section encompasses the attorney work product

privilege found in rule 192.5 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. *City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News*, 22 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. 2000); Open Records Decision No. 677 at 4-8 (2002). Rule 192.5 defines work product as

- (1) material prepared or mental impressions developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or a party's representatives, including the party's attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees, or agents; or
- (2) a communication made in anticipation of litigation or for trial between a party and the party's representatives or among a party's representatives, including the party's attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees or agents.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.5. A governmental body seeking to withhold information under this exception bears the burden of demonstrating that the information was created or developed for trial or in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or a party's representative. *Id.*; ORD 677 at 6-8. In order for this office to conclude that the information was made or developed in anticipation of litigation, we must be satisfied that

- a) a reasonable person would have concluded from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation that there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue; and b) the party resisting discovery believed in good faith that there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue and [created or obtained the information] for the purpose of preparing for such litigation.


Nat'l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 207 (Tex. 1993). A "substantial chance" of litigation does not mean a statistical probability, but rather "that litigation is more than merely an abstract possibility or unwarranted fear." *Id.* at 204; ORD 677 at 7.

Upon review, we find the city has not demonstrated that any of the information at issue consists of material prepared or mental impressions developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial by a party or a representative of a party. Likewise, the city has not sufficiently shown that any of the submitted information consists of communications made in anticipation of litigation or for trial between a party and a representative of a party or among a party's representatives. *See* TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.5. Therefore, we conclude the city may not withhold any of the submitted information on the basis of the attorney work product privilege under section 552.111 of the Government Code. As the city makes no further arguments against disclosure, the submitted information must be released to the requestor.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index_orl.php, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act must be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the Office of the Attorney General at (512) 475-2497.

Sincerely,



Christopher D. Sterner
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

CDSA/eeg

Ref: ID# 351002

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)