



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS  
GREG ABBOTT

July 2, 2013

Ms. Manuela Rendon  
Executive/Head Start Director  
Neighbors in Need of Services, Inc.  
402 West Robertson  
San Benito, Texas 78586

OR2013-11236

Dear Ms. Rendon:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 491498.

Neighbors in Need of Services, Inc. ("NINOS"), received a request for the personnel files of the requestor's client and another named individual. You claim NINOS is not a governmental body subject to the Act. Alternatively, you claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.102, 552.117, and 552.130 of the Government Code. We have considered your claims and reviewed the submitted information. We have also received and considered comments submitted by the requestor. See Gov't Code § 552.304 (providing that interested party may submit comments stating why information should or should not be released).

We first address the threshold issue of whether NINOS is subject to the Act. The Act applies to "governmental bodies" as that term is defined in section 552.003(1)(A) of the Government Code. Under the Act, the term "governmental body" includes several enumerated kinds of entities and "the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds[.]" Gov't Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). "Public funds" means funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state. *Id.* § 552.003(5). The determination of whether an entity is a governmental body for purposes of the Act requires an analysis of the facts surrounding the entity. See *Blankenship v. Brazos Higher Educ. Auth., Inc.*, 975 S.W.2d 353, 360-62 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. denied). In Attorney General Opinion JM-821 (1987), this office concluded that "the primary issue in determining whether certain private entities are governmental bodies under the Act is whether they are supported in whole or in part by public funds or whether they expend public funds." Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 2 (1987).

Both the courts and this office previously have considered the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be “governmental bodies” that are subject to the Act “simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body.” *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228 (quoting Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973)). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted that in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office’s opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-821 (1987), quoting ORD-228 (1979). That same opinion informs that “a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a ‘governmental body.’” Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide “services traditionally provided by governmental bodies.”

*Id.* The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) and the Southwest Conference (the “SWC”), both of which received public funds, were not “governmental bodies” for purposes of the Act, because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. *See Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC were associations made up of both private and public universities. Both the NCAA and the SWC received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-31. The *Kneeland* court concluded that although the NCAA and the SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act, because the NCAA and SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds that they received from their member public institutions. *See id.* at 231; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic departments of private-school members of SWC did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *See* ORD 228 at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated that “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which have entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of section 2(1)(F).” *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was determined to be a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”) under the Act. The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *See* ORD 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted that an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found that “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded that the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent that it received the city’s financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA’s records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.*

We further note that the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3 (1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a “governmental body” under the Act. *Id.* at 4. For example, a contract or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will bring the private entity within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code. The overall nature of the relationship

created by the contract is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 509 (1988), this office concluded that a private nonprofit corporation established under the Job Training Partnership Act and supported by federal funds appropriated by the state was a governmental body for the purposes of the Act. In that case, we analyzed the state's role under the federal statute and concluded the state acted as more than a simple conduit for federal funds, in part because of the layers of decision-making and oversight provided by the state in administering the programs. *Id.* at 2. The decision noted that federal funds were initially distributed to the state and then allocated among the programs at issue. Citing Attorney General Opinions JM-716 (1987) and H-777 (1976), the decision observed that federal funds granted to a state are often treated as the public funds of the state. Furthermore, in Open Records Decision No. 563 (1990), this office held that "[f]ederal funds deposited in the state treasury become state funds." *Id.* at 5 (citing Attorney General Opinions JM-118 (1983), C-530 (1965)).

You inform us NINOS is a nonprofit organization, as defined under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), that provides "Head Start/Early Head Start . . . child development services . . . along with social services" to children and their families in Cameron and Willacy counties. You explain that eleven percent of NINOS' revenue is derived from state funds, with the remaining funding provided by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the "USDHHS").

In response to a request for additional information this office sent pursuant to section 552.303 of the Government Code, you informed this office that the federal grant funds received by NINOS are distributed directly to NINOS by the USDHHS "on an as needed liability incurred basis." *See* Gov't Code § 552.303 (if attorney general determines information in addition to that required by section 552.301 is necessary to render decision, written notice of that fact shall be given to governmental body and requestor, and governmental body shall submit necessary additional information to attorney general not later than seventh calendar day after date of receipt of notice). You state the federal funds "are utilized for payroll of all 20 Administrative Staff, 44 Support Staff, 388 Head Start Staff, and 61 Early Head Start Staff." You have provided a copy of the USDHHS Notice of Award demonstrating that the federal grant funds are used to pay personnel costs and benefits. You further advise that "[p]rogram operational expenditures are inclusive of the Fiscal Year Budget."

With regard to the remainder of NINOS' revenue, you explain, "NINOS operates the Child and Adult Care Food Program from the Texas Dept of Human Services, which is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture ["the USDA"] . . . providing support for nutrition assistance services." You have provided documentation demonstrating that the funds obtained from the USDA are used to pay for food and "51 Nutrition staff" of the Child and Adult Care Food Program and are delivered to NINOS through the Texas Department of Agriculture.

The submitted information consists of personnel records of a maintenance employee in the Head Start Program. Because NINOS received only direct federal funding for the Head Start program, it did not receive any "public funds" for purposes of the Act with regard to this program or to the named individual's employment with this program. *See* Gov't Code § 552.003(5). Accordingly, after reviewing your arguments and representations, we conclude that the portion of NINOS that administers the Head Start program is not a governmental body subject to the Act and need not comply with its disclosure provisions with regard to the instant request.<sup>1</sup> As our ruling is dispositive, we do not address the claimed exceptions.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open\\_orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open_orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Cindy Nettles  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

CN/dls

Ref: ID# 491498

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)

---

<sup>1</sup>We note that the federal Freedom of Information Act applies to records of federal agencies.