



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS  
GREG ABBOTT

November 7, 2014

Ms. Janet L. Kellogg  
Assistant City Attorney  
City of Corpus Christi  
P.O. Box 9277  
Corpus Christi, Texas 78469-9277

OR2014-20288

Dear Ms. Kellogg:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 542481 (City File No. 842).

The City of Corpus Christi (the "city") received a request for all information in the investigatory file maintained by the city's Human Relations Department regarding a specified charge of discrimination. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code. We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. This exception encompasses information other statutes make confidential. Section 2000e-5 of title 42 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part, the following:

Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved . . . alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the [EEOC] shall serve a notice of the charge . . . and shall make an investigation thereof. . . . Charges shall not be made public by the [EEOC]. . . . If the [EEOC] determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the [EEOC] shall

endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the [EEOC], its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Under this provision, if the EEOC had processed the discrimination charges to which the information at issue pertains, the EEOC would generally be prohibited from releasing information about the charges that were made. However, you inform us the city's Human Relations Department (the "department") processed the charges on behalf of the EEOC. You assert the department acted as the EEOC's agent in processing these charges and is, therefore, subject to the confidentiality requirements of section 2000e-5(b).

You explain the EEOC is authorized by statute to utilize the services of state and local fair employment practices agencies to assist in meeting its statutory mandate to enforce laws prohibiting employment discrimination. *See id.* § 2000e-4(g)(1). You state the department is a local agency authorized by section 21.152 of the Labor Code to investigate complaints of employment discrimination. You also state the department has a "work sharing agreement" with the EEOC. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged such a work sharing agreement creates a limited agency relationship between the parties. *See Griffin v. City of Dallas*, 26 F.3d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding limited designation of agency in work sharing agreement is sufficient to allow filing with EEOC to satisfy filing requirements with former Texas Commission on Human Rights).

You state in rendering performance under the work sharing agreement, the department is supervised by the EEOC's contract monitor, and the tasks the department performs and the manner in which it performs them are limited by the terms of the agreement and by EEOC rules and regulations. Under these circumstances, we agree with your assertion that under accepted agency principles, the department acts as the EEOC's agent in processing charges on behalf of the EEOC. *See Johnson v. Owens*, 629 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("An essential element of proof of agency is that the alleged principal has both the right to assign the agent's task and to control the means and details of the process by which the agent will accomplish the task."). We also agree as an agent of the EEOC, the department is bound by section 2000e-5(b) of title 42 of the United States Code and may not make public charges of discrimination that it handles on the EEOC's behalf. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); *see also McMillan v. Computer Translations Sys. & Support, Inc.*, 66 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, orig. proceeding) (under principles of agency and contract law, fact that principal is bound can serve to bind agent as well).

We note the requestor is the attorney of record for the respondent in the EEOC claim at issue. In *Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associated Dry Goods Corporation*, 449

U.S. 590 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held the “public” to whom section 2000e-5(b) forbids disclosure of certain confidential information does not include the parties to the EEOC claim. *See* 449 U.S. at 598. Thus, the city may not withhold the entirety of the submitted information from this requestor under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 2000e-5(b) of title 42 of the United States Code. We note the submitted information contains references to another EEOC claim. In *Equal Employment Opportunity Commission*, the United States Supreme Court also held information pertaining to other EEOC investigations pertaining to a party to the claim are confidential under section 2000e-5(b). *See id.* at 603-04. Thus, the city must withhold this information, which we have marked, under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 2000e-5(b) of title 42 of the United States Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. Additionally, this office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. *See* Open Records Decision No. 455 (1987). Upon review, we find the information we have marked and noted satisfies the standard articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation*. Accordingly, the city must withhold the information we have marked and noted under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Section 552.137 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body,” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). Gov’t Code § 552.137(a)-(c). We note the requestor has a right of access to his own e-mail address pursuant to section 552.137(b) of the Government Code. *Id.* § 552.137(b). The e-mail addresses we have marked and noted are not of a type excluded by subsection (c). Accordingly, the city must withhold the e-mail addresses we have marked and noted under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owners affirmatively consent to their disclosure.

In summary, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 2000e-5(b) of title 42 of the United States Code. The city must also withhold the information we have marked and noted under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. Further, the city must withhold the e-mail addresses we have marked and noted under section 552.137 of the Government Code. The remaining information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Alley Latham  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

AKL/dls

Ref: ID# 542481

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)