



**KEN PAXTON**  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

This ruling has been modified by court action.  
The ruling and judgment can be viewed in PDF  
format below.



February 18, 2015

Ms. Heather Silver  
Assistant City Attorney  
Office of the City Attorney  
City of Dallas  
1500 Marilla Street, Room 7DN  
Dallas, Texas 75201

**The ruling you have requested has been amended as a result of litigation and has been attached to this document.**

OR2015-03225

Dear Ms. Silver:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 553926.

The City of Dallas (the "city") received a request for specified e-mails pertaining to Nessel Development, a specified property, and two named individuals during a specified time period. You state the city will release some of the requested information. You claim some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.107, 552.108, 552.111, 552.130, and 552.137 of the Government Code and privileged pursuant to rule 508 of the Texas Rules Evidence.<sup>1</sup> We have considered your arguments and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.<sup>2</sup>

Initially, we note Exhibits C-2 and E are not responsive to the instant request because they do not consist of e-mails pertaining to Nessel Development, a specified property, or two named individuals during a specified time period. The city need not release nonresponsive information in response to this request, and this ruling will not address that information.

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<sup>1</sup>You also claim certain information is protected under the attorney-client privilege based on Texas Rule of Evidence 503. In this instance, however, the information is properly addressed here under section 552.107, rather than rule 503. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 3 (2002).

<sup>2</sup>We assume the "representative sample" of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent that those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

Next, you assert the date of birth at issue is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy on the basis of the decision in *City of Dallas v. Abbott*, No. D-1-GV-12-000861 (53rd Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., July 11, 2013). Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. However, upon review, we find the court’s decision, which the Office of the Attorney General appealed and is pending with the Third Court of Appeals of Texas, Case No. 03-13-00546CV, is limited to the facts and information at issue in the underlying letter rulings, and does not apply to the information currently at issue. Accordingly, the city may not withhold the date of birth in the information at issue based on the court’s decision in that case.

We understand you to contend the date of birth at issue is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 521.051 of the Business and Commerce Code. Section 521.051(a) of the Business and Commerce Code provides:

A person may not obtain, possess, transfer, or use personal identifying information of another person without the other person’s consent and with intent to obtain a good, a service, insurance, an extension of credit, or any other thing of value in the other person’s name.

Bus. & Comm. Code § 521.051(a). “Personal identifying information” means “information that alone or in conjunction with other information identifies an individual” and includes an individual’s date of birth. *Id.* § 521.002(a)(1)(A). You assert the marked date of birth meets the definition of “personal identifying information” under section 521.002(a)(1) of the Business and Commerce Code. *See id.* § 521.002(a)(1). We note section 521.051(a) of the Business and Commerce Code does not prohibit the transfer of personal identifying information of another person unless the transfer is made with the intent to obtain a good, a service, insurance, an extension of credit, or any other thing of value in the other person’s name without that person’s consent. *See id.* § 521.051(a). In this instance, the city’s release of the information at issue would be for the purpose of complying with the Act, and not “with intent to obtain a good, a service, insurance, an extension of credit, or any other thing of value[.]” *See id.* Therefore, section 521.051(a) of the Business and Commerce Code does not prohibit the city from transferring the requested information. Accordingly, the city may not withhold the marked date of birth under section 552.101 in conjunction with section 521.051 of the Business and Commerce Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the common-law informer’s privilege, which Texas courts have long recognized. *See Aguilar v. State*, 444 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). The informer’s privilege protects from disclosure the identity of a person who has reported activities over which the governmental body has criminal or quasi-criminal law-enforcement authority, provided the subject of the information does not already know the informer’s identity. *See Open Records Decision No. 208 at 1-2 (1978)*. The informer’s privilege protects the identity of an individual who has reported violations

of statutes to the police or similar law-enforcement agencies, as well as an individual who has reported violations of statutes with civil or criminal penalties to “administrative officials having a duty of inspection or of law enforcement within their particular spheres.” Open Records Decision No. 279 at 1-2 (1981) (citing 8 John H. Wigmore, *Evidence in Trials at Common Law*, § 2374, at 767 (J. McNaughton Rev. Ed. 1961)). The report must be of a violation of a criminal or civil statute. See Open Records Decision Nos. 582 at 2 (1990), 515 at 4 (1988).

You state the information you have marked identifies a complainant who reported possible violations of section 7A-18 of the Dallas City Code to a city council member, who forwarded the complaints to the Community Prosecution Division of the city attorney’s office, which you state is responsible for enforcing the law in question. We understand the city council oversees the Community Prosecution Division. You further state a violation of section 7A-18 is a misdemeanor punishable by fine. We have no indication the subject of the complaints is aware of the identity of the complainant. Based on these representations and our review, we conclude the city has demonstrated the applicability of the common-law informer’s privilege to the information you have marked. Therefore, the city may withhold the information you have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the common-law informer’s privilege.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. Gov’t Code § 552.107(1). When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies to only communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies to only a confidential communication, *id.*, meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne*

*v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You state the information in Exhibit F and the information you have marked in Exhibit G constitute communications between city attorneys and city employees that were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the city. You also state the communications were intended to be confidential and have remained confidential. Based on your representations and our review, we find the city may withhold the information in Exhibit F and the information you have marked in Exhibit G under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.<sup>3</sup>

Section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “[i]nformation held by a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that deals with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime . . . if . . . release of the information would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.108(a)(1). A governmental body claiming section 552.108 must reasonably explain how and why the release of the requested information would interfere with law enforcement. *See id.* §§ 552.108(a)(1), .301(e)(1)(A); *see also Ex parte Pruitt*, 551 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977). You state Exhibits C and C-1 relate to a pending criminal investigation. Based upon this representation and our review, we find release of the information at issue would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime. *See Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of Houston*, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975) (court delineates law enforcement interests that are present in active cases), *writ ref’d n.r.e. per curiam*, 536 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1976). Accordingly, the city may withhold Exhibits C and C-1 under section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code.

Section 552.130 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure information that relates to a motor vehicle operator’s license or driver’s license or a motor vehicle title or registration issued by a Texas agency, or an agency of another state or country. *See Gov’t Code* § 552.130(a)(1)-(2). Upon review, we find the city must withhold the motor vehicle record information you have marked and the information we have marked under section 552.130 of the Government Code.

Section 552.137 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body,” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail

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<sup>3</sup>As our ruling is dispositive for this information, we need not address your remaining argument against its disclosure.


address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). *See id.* § 552.137(a)-(c). The e-mail addresses at issue are not a type specifically excluded by section 552.137(c). Accordingly, the city must withhold the e-mail addresses you have marked and the e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owners of the e-mail addresses affirmatively consent to their disclosure.

In summary, the city may withhold the information you have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the common-law informer's privilege. The city may withhold the information you have marked under section 552.107 of the Government Code. The city may withhold Exhibits C and C-1 under section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code. The city must withhold the motor vehicle record information you have marked and the information we have marked under section 552.130 of the Government Code. The city must withhold the e-mail addresses you have marked and the e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owners of the e-mail addresses affirmatively consent to their disclosure. The remaining information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Jennifer Luttrall  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

JL/akg

Ref: ID# 553926

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)

OCT 21 2015

At 3:00 P M.  
Velva L. Price, District Clerk

Cause No. D-1-GV-12-001471

CITY OF DALLAS,  
*Plaintiff,*

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

v.

GREG ABBOTT,  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,  
*Defendant.*


TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

53rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

**FINAL JUDGMENT**

On October 20, 2015, the above-styled and numbered cause came on for trial. Plaintiff, the City of Dallas, and Defendant, Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, appeared by counsel of record and announced ready. This cause is an action under the Public Information Act (PIA), Tex. Gov't Code ch. 552, in which the City of Dallas (the "City"), sought to withhold certain information from public disclosure. The parties submitted all matters in controversy, legal and factual, to the Court. The Court renders judgment for the City of Dallas.


In accordance with *Paxton v. City of Dallas*, No. 03-13-00546-CV, 2015 WL 3394061 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2015, pet. denied), it is ADJUDGED, ORDERED, and DECREED that the dates of birth of members of the public that are subject to the following attorney general rulings are excepted from disclosure under PIA section 552.101 as information coming within the common-law right of privacy: OR2012-15687, OR2013-13460, OR2013-14173, OR2013-15029, OR2014-02027, OR2014-03053, OR2014-10958, OR2014-12007, OR2014-13280, OR2015-00856, OR2015-03225, OR2015-04746, OR2015-06486, OR2015-09796, OR2015-09650, OR2015-12740, OR2015-12882, OR2015-11167, OR2015-12505, OR2015-14442, OR2015-12568, OR2015-15076, OR2015-14991, OR2015-15428, OR2015-15574, OR2015-16409, OR2015-16823, OR2015-17001, OR2015-16711, OR2015-17686, OR2015-17639, and OR2015-18652.




All relief not expressly granted is denied.

This judgment disposes of all claims between all parties and is a final judgment.

SIGNED on the 20<sup>th</sup> day of OCTOBER, 2015.

  
PRESIDING JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

  
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