



KEN PAXTON  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

April 23, 2015

Mr. Gary B. Lawson  
Counsel for the Greater Irving Las Colinas Chamber of Commerce  
Strasburger & Price, L.L.P.  
901 Main Street, Suite 4400  
Dallas, Texas 75202-3794

OR2015-07872

Dear Mr. Lawson:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 560991.

The Greater Irving Las Colinas Chamber of Commerce (the "chamber"), which you represent, received a request for specified e-mails.<sup>1</sup> You contend the chamber is not a governmental body that is subject to the Act. Nevertheless, you state the chamber will release most of the requested information. Additionally, in the alternative, you claim the remaining responsive information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.102, and 552.111 of the Government Code. We have considered your arguments and reviewed the submitted information.

The Act applies to "governmental bodies", which are defined, in pertinent part, as

the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds[.]

---

<sup>1</sup>We note the chamber sought and received clarification of the information requested. *See* Gov't Code § 552.222 (providing if request for information is unclear, governmental body may ask requestor to clarify request); *see also* *City of Dallas v. Abbott*, 304 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (holding that when a governmental entity, acting in good faith, requests clarification or narrowing of an unclear or overbroad request for information, the ten-day period to request an attorney general ruling is measured from the date the request is clarified or narrowed).

Gov't Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). "Public funds" means "funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state." *Id.* § 552.003(5). The determination of whether an entity is a governmental body for purposes of the Act requires an analysis of the facts surrounding the entity. *See Blankenship v. Brazos Higher Educ. Auth., Inc.*, 975 S.W.2d 353, 360-62 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. denied). In Attorney General Opinion JM-821 (1987), this office concluded "the primary issue in determining whether certain private entities are governmental bodies under the Act is whether they are supported in whole or in part by public funds or whether they expend public funds." Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 2. Thus, the entity would be considered a governmental body subject to the Act if it spends or is supported in whole or in part by public funds.

Both the courts and this office previously have considered the scope of the definition of "governmental body" under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be "governmental bodies" that are subject to the Act "simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body." *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973)). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office's opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes "a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser." Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-821, quoting [Open Records Decision No.] 228 (1979). That same opinion informs that "a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a 'governmental body'." Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide "services traditionally provided by governmental bodies."

*Id.* (omissions in original). The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA") and the Southwest Conference (the "SWC"), both of which received public funds, were not "governmental bodies" for purposes of the Act, because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. *See id.* at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC were associations made up of both private and public universities. *Id.* at 226. Both the NCAA and the SWC received dues and other

revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-31. The *Kneeland* court concluded although the NCAA and the SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act, because the NCAA and SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. *Id.* at 231. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds that they received from their member public institutions. *See id.*; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic departments of private-school members of SWC did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *See* ORD 228 at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which have entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of [the predecessor to section 552.003].” *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was determined to be a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”) under the Act. The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *See* ORD 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or

measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent it received the city’s financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA’s records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.* However, those areas for which the City of Dallas had not provided support were not subject to the Act. *Id.*

We note the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3 (1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a “governmental body” under the Act. *Id.* at 4. For example, a contract or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will bring the private entity within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code. The overall nature of the relationship created by the contact is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *Id.*

In response to a request for additional information this office sent pursuant to section 552.303 of the Government Code, you inform us the chamber is a nonprofit corporation that has contracted with the City of Irving (the “city”) to promote economic development. *See* Gov’t Code § 552.303(c)-(d) (if attorney general determines that information in addition to that required by section 552.301 is necessary to render decision, written notice of that fact shall be given to governmental body and requestor, and governmental body shall submit necessary additional information to attorney general not later than seventh calendar day after receipt of notice). You have provided us with a copy of the contract between the chamber and the city. We note, although the contract imposes an obligation on the chamber to provide certain services in exchange for a certain amount of money, the contract also generally requires the chamber to assist the city in implementing its strategic plan “with specific emphasis on Strategic Goal No. 3, Cultivate an Environment Conducive to Strong, Successful Economic Development to Enhance and Diversify [the city’s] Economic Base.” As in Open Records Decision No. 228, where we construed a similar contractual provision, we believe this provision places the city in the position of “supporting” the operation of the chamber with public funds within the meaning of section 552.003 of the Government Code. *See* ORD 228.

In this case, based upon our review, we conclude that the city and the chamber share a common purpose and objective such that an agency-type relationship is created. *See* Open Records Decision No. 621 at 9 (1993); *see also* Local Gov’t Code § 380.001(a), (b) (providing that governing body of municipality may establish and provide for administration of one or more programs, including programs for making loans and grants of public money and providing personnel and services of the municipality, to promote state or local economic development and to stimulate business and commercial activity in the municipality). Further, we find that many of the specific services that the chamber provides pursuant to the contract

comprise traditional governmental functions. *See* ORD 621 at 8 n.10. Accordingly, we conclude the chamber falls within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code to the extent it is supported by city funds.

We note, however, that an organization is not necessarily a “governmental body” in its entirety. “[T]he part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds” is a governmental body. Gov’t Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii); *see also* ORD 602 (only the records of those portions of the Dallas Museum of Art that were directly supported by public funds are subject to the Act).

Therefore, only those records relating to those parts of the chamber’s operations that are directly supported by public funds are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act. As we are unable to determine from examination of the submitted documentation to what extent the chamber’s operations are supported by public funds, we must rule conditionally. Thus, to the extent the requested information pertains to chamber operations not supported by public funds, the information at issue is not subject to the Act. To the extent the requested information pertains to chamber operations supported by public funds, the requested information is public information subject to the Act and must be released unless it falls within the scope of an exception to disclosure. Accordingly, we will address your arguments against disclosure of the submitted information.

We understand you to assert the information at issue was submitted to the chamber based on a promise of confidentiality. However, information is not confidential under the Act simply because the party submitting the information to a governmental body anticipates or requests that it be kept confidential. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex. 1976). Thus, a governmental body cannot, through an agreement or contract, overrule or repeal provisions of the Act. Attorney General Opinion JM-672 (1987); Open Records Decision Nos. 541 at 3 (1990) (“[T]he obligations of a governmental body under [the predecessor to the Act] cannot be compromised simply by its decision to enter into a contract.”), 203 at 1 (1978) (mere expectation of confidentiality by person supplying information does not satisfy requirements of statutory predecessor to section 552.110). Consequently, unless the information at issue falls within an exception to disclosure, it must be released, notwithstanding any expectations or agreement specifying otherwise.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 685. To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered highly intimate or embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial*

*Foundation. Id.* at 683. Upon review, we find you have not demonstrated how any of the submitted information is highly intimate or embarrassing and not of legitimate public concern. Thus, the submitted information may not be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses constitutional privacy. Constitutional privacy consists of two interrelated types of privacy: (1) the right to make certain kinds of decisions independently and (2) an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. *See* Open Records Decision No. 455 at 4 (1987). The first type protects an individual's autonomy within "zones of privacy," which include matters related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. *Id.* The second type of constitutional privacy requires a balancing between the individual's privacy interests and the public's need to know information of public concern. *Id.* The scope of information protected is narrower than that under the common-law doctrine of privacy; the information must concern the "most intimate aspects of human affairs." *Id.* at 5 (quoting *Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Texas*, 765 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1985)). After review of the remaining information, we find you have failed to demonstrate how any portion of the submitted information falls within the zones of privacy or implicates an individual's privacy interests for purposes of constitutional privacy. Therefore, the chamber may not withhold any of the submitted information under section 552.101 of the Government Code on the basis of constitutional privacy.

Section 552.102(a) of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Gov't Code § 552.102(a). We understand you to assert the privacy analysis under section 552.102(a) is the same as the common-law privacy test under section 552.101 of the Government Code, which is discussed above. *See Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 685. In *Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, Inc.*, 652 S.W.2d 546, 549-51 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court of appeals ruled the privacy test under section 552.102(a) is the same as the *Industrial Foundation* privacy test. However, the Texas Supreme Court has expressly disagreed with *Hubert's* interpretation of section 552.102(a), and held the privacy standard under section 552.102(a) differs from the *Industrial Foundation* test under section 552.101. *See Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen. of Tex.*, 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010). The Texas Supreme Court also considered the applicability of section 552.102(a) and held it excepts from disclosure the dates of birth of state employees in the payroll database of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. *See id.* at 348. Upon review, we find the chamber may not withhold any portion of the submitted information under section 552.102(a) of the Government Code.

Section 552.111 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "[a]n interagency or intraagency memorandum or letter that would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency[.]" Gov't Code § 552.111. This exception encompasses the deliberative process privilege. *See* Open Records Decision No. 615 at 2 (1993). The purpose of section 552.111 is to protect advice, opinion, and recommendation in the decisional process

and to encourage open and frank discussion in the deliberative process. *See Austin v. City of San Antonio*, 630 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 538 at 1-2 (1990).

In Open Records Decision No. 615, this office re-examined the statutory predecessor to section 552.111 in light of the decision in *Texas Department of Public Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ). We determined section 552.111 excepts from disclosure only those internal communications that consist of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting the policymaking processes of the governmental body. *See* ORD 615 at 5. A governmental body's policymaking functions do not encompass routine internal administrative or personnel matters, and disclosure of information about such matters will not inhibit free discussion of policy issues among agency personnel. *Id.*; *see also City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News*, 22 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2000) (section 552.111 not applicable to personnel-related communications that did not involve policymaking). A governmental body's policymaking functions do include administrative and personnel matters of broad scope that affect the governmental body's policy mission. *See* Open Records Decision No. 631 at 3 (1995).

Further, section 552.111 does not protect facts and written observations of facts and events that are severable from advice, opinions, and recommendations. *Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Attorney Gen.*, 37 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); *see* ORD 615 at 5. But if factual information is so inextricably intertwined with material involving advice, opinion, or recommendation as to make severance of the factual data impractical, the factual information also may be withheld under section 552.111. *See* Open Records Decision No. 313 at 3 (1982).

Section 552.111 can also encompass communications between a governmental body and a third party, including a consultant or other party with a privity of interest. *See* Open Records Decision No. 561 at 9 (1990) (section 552.111 encompasses communications with party with which governmental body has privity of interest or common deliberative process). For section 552.111 to apply, the governmental body must identify the third party and explain the nature of its relationship with the governmental body. Section 552.111 is not applicable to a communication between the governmental body and a third party unless the governmental body establishes it has a privity of interest or common deliberative process with the third party. *See id.*

You contend the submitted information consists of internal communications, advice, and recommendations made by chamber staff to the chamber's search committee regarding policymaking issues regarding hiring the chamber's president and chief executive officer. We understand the chamber shares a privity of interest with the chamber's consultant, Waverly Partners, L.L.C., with respect to these communications. Based on your representations and our review of the information at issue, we find the chamber has demonstrated portions of the information at issue, which we have marked, consist of advice, opinions, or recommendations on the policymaking matters of the chamber. Thus, the


chamber may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.111 of the Government Code. Upon review, however, we find the remaining information is general administrative, personnel, and purely factual information. Thus, we find you have failed to show how the remaining information consists of advice, opinions, or recommendations on the policymaking matters of the chamber. Accordingly, the remaining information not be withheld under section 552.111 of the Government Code.

In summary, to the extent the submitted information pertains to chamber operations not supported by public funds, the information at issue is not subject to the Act. To the extent the submitted information pertains to chamber operations supported by public funds, the chamber may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.111 of the Government Code and must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Nicholas A. Ybarra  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

NAY/cbz

Ref: ID# 560991

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)