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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

May 1, 2015

Mr. Gary B. Lawson
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OR2015-08520

Dear Mr. Lawson:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 564294.

The Greater Irving Las Colinas Chamber of Commerce (the "chamber of commerce"), which you represent, received a request for the minutes and official written recording of all meetings of the Signature Program Committee [the "committee"] for a specified period of time, all appointments and calendars for a named individual that have been stored in Microsoft Outlook for a specified period of time, and documents listing people who made use of a Cowboy Stadium suite for a specified period of time.¹ We understand the chamber of commerce has released some of the requested information. The chamber of commerce claims the submitted information is either not subject to the Act or excepted from disclosure under sections 552.104 and 552.110 of the Government Code. We have considered the submitted arguments and reviewed the submitted information.

¹The chamber of commerce sought and received clarification of the information requested. See Gov't Code § 552.222 (if request for information is unclear, governmental body may ask requestor to clarify request); see also *City of Dallas v. Abbott*, 304 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (if governmental entity, acting in good faith, requests clarification of unclear or over-broad request, ten-day period to request attorney general ruling is measured from date request is clarified).

The Act applies to “governmental bodies” as that term is defined in section 552.003(1)(A) of the Government Code. Under the Act, the term “governmental body” includes several enumerated kinds of entities and “the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). The term “public funds” means funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state. *Id.* § 552.003(5).

Both the courts and this office have previously considered the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be “governmental bodies” that are subject to the Act “simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body.” *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228; *see* Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office’s opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” Tex. Att’y Gen. No. HM-821 (1987), quoting ORD-228 (1979). That same opinion informs that “a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a ‘governmental body.’” Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide “services traditionally provided by governmental bodies.”

Kneeland, 850 F.2d at 228. The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) and the Southwest Conference (the “SWC”), both of which received public funds, were not “governmental bodies” for purposes of the Act because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. *See id.* at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-231. The *Kneeland* court concluded, although the NCAA and SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act because

the NCAA and the SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds they received from their member public institutions. *See id.* at 231; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic departments of private-school members of SWC did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *See* ORD 228 at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of [the predecessor to section 552.003].” *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”) under the Act. The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city, and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *See* ORD 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and a purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent it received the city’s financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA’s records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.* However, those areas for which the city had not provided support were not subject to the Act. *Id.*

We note the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3 (1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a “governmental body” under the Act. *Id.* at 4. For example, a contract or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will bring the private entity within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code. The overall nature of the relationship created by the contact is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *Id.*

You state the chamber of commerce receives public funding from the City of Irving (the “city”). *See* Gov’t Code § 552.003(5) (defining public funds). You also inform us “[t]he [chamber of commerce] was formed for the express purpose to create and promote an environment for business opportunities that advances growth for its members and the Irving-Las Colinas community.” Accordingly, based upon our review of the submitted information, we conclude the city and the chamber of commerce share a common purpose and objective such that an agency-type relationship is created. *See* Open Records Decision No. 621 (1993) at 9. Therefore, we conclude the chamber of commerce falls within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code to the extent it is supported by city funds.

However, we further note an organization is not necessarily a “governmental body” in its entirety. “[T]he part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds” is a governmental body. Gov’t Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii); *see also* ORD 602 (only records of those portions of DMA that were directly supported by public funds are subject to Act). Therefore, only those records relating to those parts of the chamber of commerce’s operations that are directly supported by public funds are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act.

You inform us the public funds the chamber of commerce receives from the city are kept in a separate bank account, and the chamber of commerce can specifically account for how and when those funds are expended. You state that in this instance, the responsive information pertains to a committee of the chamber of commerce that is funded wholly by non-public funds. You explain

The [committee] is comprised of volunteers[.] . . . No member of the committee is compensated (much less compensated from public funds) nor are any public funds expended in support of these meetings. Further, the [committee] does not make any decisions regarding the use of public funds. Rather, the [committee] and the signatures program that the [chamber of


commerce] puts on are 100% funded by private funds and do not expend funds received from a governmental entity.”

Based on these assertions, we conclude, because the information at issue pertains to programs or activities of the committee that you inform us are not supported in whole or in part by public funds, the submitted information, which consists of the minutes of committee meetings, is not subject to release under the Act. *See id.* § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). Accordingly, the chamber of commerce is not required to release the submitted information to the requestor.²

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General’s Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



James L. Coggeshall
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

JLC/cbz

Ref: ID# 564294

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)

²As our ruling is dispositive, we do not address the chamber of commerce’s arguments to withhold this information under the Act.