



**KEN PAXTON**  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

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OR2015-08594

Dear Mr. Hudson:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 562086.

The West I-10 Volunteer Fire Department (the "department"), which you represent, received a request for information during specified time periods, including (1) bank statements; (2) check ledgers; (3) balance sheets and profit and loss statements; (4) purchase orders; (5) documents pertaining to any investigation, review, analysis, or accounting of financial records; (6) e-mails between the department's board consisting of specified terms; (7) documents pertaining to the department's board meetings; (8) roster of volunteers; (9) roster of full-time and paid part-time personnel and duty crew personnel; and (10) the roster of the department's emergency medical services full-time and paid part-time personnel. You first claim the department is not a governmental body, and thus, the requested information is not subject to the Act. In the alternative, you claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.107 of the Government Code. We have considered your comments and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.

The Act applies to "governmental bodies" as that term is defined in section 552.003(1)(A) of the Government Code. Under the Act, the term "governmental body" includes several enumerated kinds of entities and "the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or

in part by public funds[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). The phrase “public funds” means funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state. *Id.* § 552.003(5).

Both the courts and this office previously have considered the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be “governmental bodies” that are subject to the Act “simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body.” *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228; *see* Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office’s opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-821 (1987), quoting ORD-228 (1979). That same opinion informs that “a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a ‘governmental body.’” Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide “services traditionally provided by governmental bodies.”

*Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228. The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) and the Southwest Conference (the “SWC”), both of which received public funds, were not “governmental bodies” for purposes of the Act because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. *See id.* at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC were associations made up of both private and public universities. Both the NCAA and the SWC received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-31. The *Kneeland* court concluded although the NCAA and the SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act, because the NCAA and SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds they received from their member public institutions. *See id.* at 231; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v.*

*S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic departments of private-school members of SWC did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *See* ORD 228 at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which have entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of [the predecessor to section 552.003].” *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was determined to be a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”) under the Act. The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *See* ORD 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent it received the city’s financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA’s records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.* However, those areas for which the city had not provided support were not subject to the Act. *Id.*

We note the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3

(1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a “governmental body” under the Act. *Id.* at 4. For example, a contract or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will bring the private entity within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code. The overall nature of the relationship created by the contract is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *Id.*

“Whether or not a particular nonprofit volunteer fire department [is a governmental body subject to the Act] depends on the circumstances in each case, including the terms of the contract between the department and the public entity.” *Id.* at 5 (citation omitted). Because fire protection is one of the services traditionally provided by governmental bodies, different considerations apply to fire departments that set them apart from private vendors of goods and services who typically deal with governmental bodies in arms-length transactions and make them more likely to fall within the Act. *Id.* In Attorney General Opinion JM-821, this office held the Cy-Fair Volunteer Fire Department (“Cy-Fair”) was a governmental body for purposes of the Act’s predecessor to the extent it was supported by public funds received pursuant to its contract with the Harris County Rural Fire Prevention District No. 9 (“RFPD”). *See id.* In issuing that opinion, this office analyzed the contract between Cy-Fair and RFPD, noting Cy-Fair received public funds to provide all of RFPD’s needed services. *See id.* This office also noted the contract provided Cy-Fair must submit one-year operating budgets and a three-year capital expenditure budget to RFPD for approval. Consequently, this office found the contract provided for the general support of Cy-Fair for purposes of the Act’s predecessor. *Id.*

In this instance, you inform us the department is a private, non-profit corporation that entered into an agreement to provide fire suppression and emergency services to residents who reside in two emergency services districts, including Harris County Emergency Services District No. 48 (the “district”). You have submitted the “Agreement for the Payment of Fire Protection and Suppression Services and Emergency Medical Services” (the “agreement”) between the department and the district. The agreement states the department shall provide emergency services to residents, commercial interests, and others within the district on a twenty-four hours per day basis seven days a week. Further, the agreement states the district will not provide these services except for the providing of funds and a Fire Chief, to assist the department in carrying out its duties and responsibilities, and facilities and equipment. The agreement also states the department and all of its personnel are independent contractors and have the right to control the details of the work in providing the emergency services. However, the agreement provides the department will submit monthly invoices for the operating budget monthly allocation, including the income received by the department for services provided under the agreement, and the anticipated capital improvements budget expenditures to the district for approval. The department also provides each year an

“Operating and Capital Improvements Budget” to the district for approval. Additionally, the department must submit to the district annually an audit and financial review of the department’s books and financial records. The agreement also provides title to items of property over \$5,000 and all land purchased wholly with district appropriated funds shall be in the name of the district.

We note the agreement states monies donated to the department shall be maintained in a separate bank account and not commingled with funds provided by the district. The department has independent authority in purchases made with donated monies. Upon review, we conclude the department is supported in part by public funds. Further, we find the specific services the department provides pursuant to the agreement comprise traditional governmental functions. *See* ORD 621 at 8 n.10. Accordingly, we conclude the department falls within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code to the extent it is supported by district funds.

However, an organization is not necessarily a “governmental body” in its entirety. “[T]he part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds” is a governmental body. Gov’t Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii); *see also* ORD 602 (only records of those portions of DMA that were directly supported by public funds are subject to Act). Therefore, only those records relating to those parts of the department’s operations that are directly supported by public funds are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act. Thus, we will address your argument against disclosure of the requested information, to the extent it relates to the department’s operations supported by public funds.

We note you have only submitted a representative sample of information responsive to the portion of the request asking for e-mails and investigation documents. However, you have not submitted any information responsive to the remaining categories of the request, including bank statements, check ledgers, balance sheets and profit and loss statements, purchase orders, board meeting documents, and rosters. Although you state the department submitted a representative sample of the requested information, we find the submitted information is not representative of the other types of information to which the requestor seeks access. Please be advised this open records letter applies to only the types of information you have submitted for our review. This ruling does not authorize the department to withhold any information that is substantially different from the type of information you submitted to this office. *See* Gov’t Code § 552.302. Therefore, to the extent information responsive to the remaining portions of the request exists and was maintained by the department on the date it received the request, we assume the department has released it to the requestor. If the department has not released any such information, it must do so at this time. *Id.* §§ 552.301(a), .302; Open Records Decision No. 664 (2000) (noting that if governmental body concludes that no exceptions apply to requested information, it must release information as soon as possible under circumstances).

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a *confidential* communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You claim the submitted information consists of communications between the department and its attorneys that were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the department. You state these communications were intended to be confidential and have remained confidential. Based on your representations and our review, we find you have demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the information at issue. Thus, the department may generally withhold the submitted information under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. We note, however, some of the privileged e-mail strings include e-mails received from or sent to individuals you have not demonstrated are privileged parties. If these e-mails are removed from the privileged e-mail strings and stand alone, they are responsive to the request for information. Therefore, if the non-privileged e-mails we have marked are maintained by the department separate and

apart from the otherwise privileged e-mail strings in which they appear, then the department may not withhold these non-privileged e-mails under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. In that instance, the non-privileged e-mails must be released.<sup>1</sup>

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Lauren Dahlstein  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

LMD/som

Ref: ID# 562086

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)

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<sup>1</sup>We note the requestor has a right of access to his own e-mail address pursuant to section 552.137(b) of the Government Code. See Gov't Code § 552.137(b).