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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

May 12, 2015

Mr. Howard C. Berger
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OR2015-09221

Dear Mr. Berger:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 563554.

The Wilson County Volunteer Ambulance Association (the "association"), which you represent, received a request for 1) "any and all incident reports for the Floresville Residence and Rehabilitation Center at 1811 Sixth Street, Floresville, Texas 78114 for the years 2013 to the present" and 2) "all run reports, incidents, recordings, documents, EMS medical records, investigative memorandum pertaining to Floresville Residence and Rehabilitation Center for the incident occurring on January 29, 2014," involving a named individual.¹ The association claims it is not a governmental body, and thus, the requested information is not subject to the Act. In the alternative, the association claims the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code.² We have considered the association's arguments and reviewed the requested representative sample of information.³

¹As the association has not submitted a copy of the request for information, we take our description from its brief.

²We note the association did not comply with section 552.301 of the Government Code in requesting this decision. *See* Gov't Code § 552.301(b), (e). Nonetheless, because section 552.101 of the Government Code can provide a compelling reason to overcome the presumption of openness, we will consider its applicability to the submitted information. *See id.* §§ 552.007, .302, .352.

³We assume the "representative sample" of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

The Act applies to “governmental bodies” as that term is defined in section 552.003(1)(A) of the Government Code. Under the Act, the term “governmental body” includes several enumerated kinds of entities and “the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). The term “public funds” means funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state. *Id.* § 552.003(5).

Both the courts and this office have previously considered the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be “governmental bodies” that are subject to the Act “simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body.” *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228; *see* Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office’s opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” Tex. Att’y Gen. No. HM-821 (1987), quoting [Open Records Decision No.] 228 (1979). That same opinion informs that “a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a ‘governmental body.’” Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide “services traditionally provided by governmental bodies.”

Kneeland, 850 F.2d at 228. The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) and the Southwest Conference (the “SWC”), both of which received public funds, were not “governmental bodies” for purposes of the Act because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. *See id.* at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-231. The *Kneeland* court concluded, although the NCAA and SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act because

the NCAA and the SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds they received from their member public institutions. *See id.* at 231; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic departments of private-school members of SWC did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *See* ORD 228 at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of [the predecessor to section 552.003].” *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”) under the Act. The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city, and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *See* ORD 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and a purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent it received the city’s financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA’s records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.* However, those areas for which the city had not provided support were not subject to the Act. *Id.*

We note the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3 (1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a “governmental body” under the Act. *Id.* at 4. For example, a contract or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will bring the private entity within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code. The overall nature of the relationship created by the contract is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *Id.*

Additionally, Attorney General Opinion JM-821 addressed whether a volunteer fire department was a governmental body. “Whether or not a particular nonprofit volunteer fire department [is a governmental body subject to the Act] depends on the circumstances in each case, including the terms of the contract between the department and the public entity.” *Id.* at 5 (citation omitted). Because fire protection is one of the services traditionally provided by governmental bodies, different considerations apply to fire departments that set them apart from private vendors of goods and services who typically deal with governmental bodies in arms-length transactions and make them more likely to fall within the Act. *Id.* In Attorney General Opinion JM-821, this office held the Cy-Fair Volunteer Fire Department (“Cy-Fair”) was a governmental body for purposes of the Act’s predecessor to the extent it was supported by public funds received pursuant to its contract with the Harris County Rural Fire Prevention District No. 9 (“RFPD”). *See id.* In issuing that opinion, this office analyzed the contract between Cy-Fair and RFPD, noting Cy-Fair received public funds to provide all of RFPD’s needed services. *See id.* This office also noted the contract provided Cy-Fair must submit one-year operating budgets and a three-year capital expenditure budget to RFPD for approval. Consequently, this office found the contract provided for the general support of Cy-Fair for purposes of the Act’s predecessor. *Id.*

The association states it is a non-profit corporation which provides emergency medical services to a portion of Wilson County (the “county”) under the terms of a written agreement. The association has provided a copy of the agreement. The association contends that pursuant to the agreement, the funds paid by the county are restricted in their use in that they are to be used exclusively for equipment and fuel. However, we note the agreement states its purpose is to “assist [the association] to provide emergency ambulance services within the unincorporated areas of [the county].” Further, the agreement states the funds paid by the county are to be used, in part, for the purposes of “responding to medical emergencies within the area designated by [the county.]” Based on our review, we find the county provides general support to the association. Further, we find the services the association provides pursuant to the agreement comprise traditional governmental functions. *See* Open Records Decision No. 621 at 8 n.10 (1993). Accordingly, we conclude the association falls within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code for the services it provides to the County and the information at issue is

subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act. Accordingly, we will address the association's arguments against disclosure of the information at issue.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code exempts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 of the Government Code encompasses section 773.091 of the Health and Safety Code. Section 773.091 provides in part:

(b) Records of the identity, evaluation, or treatment of a patient by emergency medical services personnel or by a physician providing medical supervision that are created by the emergency medical services personnel or physician or maintained by an emergency medical services provider are confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed except as provided by this chapter.

...

(g) The privilege of confidentiality under this section does not extend to information regarding the presence, nature of injury or illness, age, sex, occupation, and city of residence of a patient who is receiving emergency medical services.

Health & Safety Code § 773.091(b), (g). Except for the information specified in section 773.091(g), emergency medical services ("EMS") records are deemed confidential and may be released only in accordance with chapter 773 of the Health & Safety Code. *See id.* §§ 773.091, .094.

Upon review, we find the information at issue constitutes records of the identity, evaluation, or treatment of patients by EMS personnel. Thus, this information constitutes EMS records that are subject to chapter 773 of the Health and Safety Code. Accordingly, except for information subject to section 773.091(g), the EMS records must be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 773.091 of the Health and Safety Code.⁴

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses section 181.006 of the Health and Safety Code, which provides the following:

[F]or a covered entity that is a governmental unit, an individual's protected health information:

⁴This ruling does not affect an individual's right of access to a patient's EMS records from the EMS provider. *See* Health & Safety Code §§ 773.092, .093; *cf. Abbott v. Tex. State Bd. of Pharmacy*, 391 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (Medical Practice Act does not provide patient general right of access to his or her medical records from governmental body responding to request for information under Public Information Act).

(1) includes any information that reflects that an individual received health care from the covered entity; and

(2) is not public information and is not subject to disclosure under [the Act].

Id. § 181.006. Section 181.001(b)(2)(A) defines “covered entity” to include any person who:

(A) for commercial, financial, or professional gain, monetary fees, or dues, or on a cooperative, nonprofit, or pro bono basis, engages, in whole or in part, and with real or constructive knowledge, in the practice of assembling, collecting, analyzing, using, evaluating, storing, or transmitting protected health information. The term includes a business associate, health care payer, governmental unit, information or computer management entity, school, health researcher, health care facility, clinic, health care provider, or person who maintains an Internet site[.]

Id. § 181.001(b)(2)(A). The authority indicates it is a covered entity for purposes of section 181.006 of the Health and Safety Code. However, in order to determine whether the authority is a covered entity, we must address whether the authority engages in the practice of “assembling, collecting, analyzing, using, evaluating, storing, or transmitting protected health information.” *Id.* Section 181.001 states that “[u]nless otherwise defined in this chapter, each term that is used in this chapter has the meaning assigned by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and Privacy Standards [(“HIPAA”).]” *Id.* § 181.001(a). Accordingly, as chapter 181 does not define “protected health information,” we turn to HIPAA’s definition of the term. HIPAA defines “protected health information” as individually identifiable health information that is transmitted or maintained in electronic media or any other form or medium. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. HIPAA defines “individually identifiable health information” as information that is a subset of health information, including demographic information collected from an individual, and:

(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse; and

(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and

(i) That identifies the individual; or

(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual.

Id. Although the authority indicates it is a covered entity, the authority has not explained how the remaining information consists of protected health information. Thus, we find the authority has failed to demonstrate the applicability of section 181.006 of the Health and Safety Code. Accordingly, the authority may not withhold any of the remaining information at issue under section 552.101 of the Government Code on that basis.

In summary, except for any information subject to section 773.091(g), which the association must release, the EMS records must be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 773.091 of the Health and Safety Code.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Rahat Huq
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

RSH/eb

Ref: ID# 563554

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)