



**KEN PAXTON**  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

July 31, 2015

Mr. James Kopp  
Assistant City Attorney  
Office of the City Attorney  
City of San Antonio  
P.O. Box 839966  
San Antonio, Texas 78283

OR2015-15668

Dear Mr. Kopp:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 573952 (COSA File No. W084217).

The City of San Antonio (the "city") received a request for twelve categories of information pertaining to an incident involving the requestor's client. You state you will release some information. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.108 of the Government Code. We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted information, a portion of which consists of a representative sample of information.<sup>1</sup>

Initially, we note some of the submitted information, which we have marked, is not responsive to the instant request because it is not related to the specified incident. This ruling does not address the public availability of any information that is not responsive to the request and the city is not required to release such information in response to this request.

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<sup>1</sup>We assume the representative sample of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of any other requested records to the extent that those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

Section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “[i]nformation held by a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that deals with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime . . . if . . . release of the information would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.108(a)(1). A governmental body claiming section 552.108(a)(1) must reasonably explain how and why the release of the requested information would interfere with law enforcement. *See id.* § 552.301(e)(1)(A); *see also Ex parte Pruitt*, 551 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977). You state the submitted information relates to an ongoing criminal investigation and prosecution. Based on this representation, we find the release of the submitted responsive information would interfere with the detection, investigation, and prosecution of a crime. *See Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of Houston*, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975) (court delineates law enforcement interests that are present in active cases), *writ ref’d n.r.e. per curiam*, 536 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1976). Thus, section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code is applicable to the submitted responsive information.

We note, however, section 552.108 of the Government Code does not except from disclosure “basic information about an arrested person, an arrest, or a crime.” Gov’t Code § 552.108(c). Basic information refers to the information held to be public in *Houston Chronicle*. *See* 531 S.W.2d at 186-88; Open Records Decision No. 127 (1976) (summarizing the types of information considered to be basic information). Thus, with the exception of the basic information, the city may generally withhold the remaining responsive information under section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code.

We note the requestor is a representative of Disability Rights Texas (“DRTX”), which has been designated as the state’s protection and advocacy system (“P&A system”) for purposes of the federal Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (the “PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (the “DDA Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act (the “PAIR Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794e. *See* Tex. Gov. Exec. Order No. DB-33, 2 Tex. Reg. 3713 (1977); Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 (2002); *see also* 42 C.F.R. §§ 51.2 (defining “designated official” and requiring official to designate agency to be accountable for funds of P&A agency), 51.22 (requiring P&A agency to have a governing authority responsible for control).

The PAIMI provides, in relevant part, DRTX, as the state’s P&A system, shall

(1) have the authority to—

(A) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the [P&A] system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred[.]

42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(A). Further, the PAIMI provides DRTX shall

(4) . . . have access to all records of—

(A) any individual who is a client of the [P&A] system if such individual, or the legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative of such individual, has authorized the [P&A] system to have such access[.]

*Id.* § 10805(a)(4)(A). The term “records” as used in the above-quoted provision

includes reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment or reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning records.

*Id.* § 10806(b)(3)(A). Additionally, the federal regulations promulgated under the PAIMI address the P&A system’s right of access and provide that the term “records” includes “[i]nformation and individual records, obtained in the course of providing intake, assessment, evaluation, supportive and other services, including medical records, . . . and reports prepared or received by a member of the staff of a facility . . . rendering care or treatment.” 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c)(1). Further, the PAIMI defines the term “facilities” and states the term “may include . . . hospitals, . . . jails and prisons.” 42 U.S.C. § 10802(3). The DDA Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system shall

(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the [P&A] system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred;

...

(I) have access to all records of—

(i) any individual with a developmental disability who is a client of the [P&A] system if such individual, or the legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative of such individual, has authorized the [P&A] system to have such access[.]

...

(J)(i) have access to the records of individuals described in subparagraphs (B) and (I), and other records that are relevant to conducting an investigation, under the circumstances described in those subparagraphs, not later than 3

business days after the [P&A] system makes a written request for the records involved[.]

*Id.* § 15043(a)(2)(B), (I), (J)(i). The DDA Act states the term “record” includes

(1) a report prepared or received by any staff at any location at which services, supports, or other assistance is provided to individuals with developmental disabilities;

(2) a report prepared by an agency or staff person charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse or neglect, injury, or death occurring at such location, that describes such incidents and the steps taken to investigate such incidents; and

(3) a discharge planning record.

*Id.* § 15043(c). The PAIR Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system will “have the same . . . access to records . . . as are set forth in [the DDA ACT].” 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2).

A state statute is preempted by federal law to the extent it conflicts with that federal law. *See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Orange*, 905 F. Supp. 381, 382 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Further, federal regulations provide that state law must not diminish the required authority of a P&A system. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 1386.21(f); *see also Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Gerard*, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (broad right of access under section 15043 of title 42 of the United States Code applies despite existence of any state or local laws or regulations which attempt to restrict access; although state law may expand authority of P&A system, state law cannot diminish authority set forth in federal statutes); *Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Rasmussen*, 206 F.R.D. 630, 639 (S.D. Iowa 2001); *cf.* 42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(2)(C). Similarly, Texas law states, “[n]otwithstanding other state law, [a P&A system] . . . is entitled to access to records relating to persons with mental illness to the extent authorized by federal law.” Health & Safety Code § 615.002(a). Thus, the PAIMI and the DDA Act grant DRTX access to “records,” and, to the extent state law provides for the confidentiality of “records” requested by DRTX, its federal rights of access under the PAIMI and the DDA Act preempt state law. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c); *see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n*, 905 F. Supp. at 382. Accordingly, we must address whether the information at issue constitutes “records” of an individual with a mental illness as defined by the PAIMI or a disability as defined by the DDA Act.

Although the definition of “records” is not limited to the information specifically described in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) of title 42 of the United States Code, we do not believe Congress intended for the definitions to be so expansive as to grant a P&A system

access to any information it deems necessary.<sup>2</sup> Such a reading of the statute would render sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) insignificant. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (statute should be construed in a way that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant). Furthermore, in light of Congress's evident preference for limiting the scope of access, we are unwilling to assume that Congress meant more than it said in enacting the PAIMI and the DDA Act. *See Kofa v. INS*, 60 F.3d 1084 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that statutory construction must begin with language of statute; to do otherwise would assume that Congress does not express its intent in words of statutes, but only by way of legislative history). *See generally Coast Alliance v. Babbitt*, 6 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that if, in following Congress's plain language in statute, agency cannot carry out Congress's intent, remedy is not to distort or ignore Congress's words, but rather to ask Congress to address problem). Based on this analysis, we believe the information specifically described in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) is indicative of the types of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. *See Penn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun*, 228 F.3d 423, 426 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2000) ("[I]t is clear that the definition of 'records' in § 10806 controls the types of records to which [the P&A system] 'shall have access' under § 10805[.]").

The submitted information consists of a criminal law enforcement investigation that is being utilized for law enforcement purposes. We note this type of information is not among the information specifically listed as a "record" in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c). Furthermore, we find the submitted information is not the type of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. Consequently, we find DRTX does not have a right of access to the submitted information under either the PAIMI or the DDA Act.

In summary, with the exception of basic information, which must be released, the city may withhold the remaining responsive information under section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.


This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for

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<sup>2</sup>Use of the term "includes" in section 10806(b)(3)(A) of title 42 of the United States Code indicates the definition of "records" is not limited to the information specifically listed in that section. *See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 78 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1996); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41.

providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Paigelay".

Paige Lay  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

PL/bhf

Ref: ID# 573952

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)