



**KEN PAXTON**  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

August 13, 2015

Ms. Aimee Alcorn  
Assistant City Attorney  
City of Corpus Christi  
P.O. Box 9277  
Corpus Christi, Texas 78469-9277

OR2015-16752

Dear Ms. Alcorn:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 575322 (City File no. 627).

The City of Corpus Christi (the "city") received a request for all documents related to two named individuals in a specified Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code. We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. This exception encompasses information other statutes make confidential. Section 2000e-5 of title 42 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part, the following:

Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved . . . alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the [EEOC] shall serve a notice of the charge . . . and shall make an investigation thereof. . . . Charges shall not be made public by the [EEOC]. . . . If the [EEOC] determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the [EEOC] shall

endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the [EEOC], its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Under this provision, if the EEOC had processed the discrimination charge to which the information at issue pertains, the EEOC would be prohibited from releasing information about the charge that were made. However, you inform us the city's Human Relations Department (the "department") processed the charge on behalf of the EEOC. You assert the department acted as the EEOC's agent in processing this charge and is, therefore, subject to the confidentiality requirements of section 2000e-5(b).

You explain the EEOC is authorized by statute to utilize the services of state and local fair employment practices agencies to assist in meeting its statutory mandate to enforce laws prohibiting employment discrimination. *See id.* § 2000e-4(g)(1). You state the department is a local agency authorized by section 21.152 of the Labor Code to investigate complaints of employment discrimination. You also state the department has a "work sharing agreement" with the EEOC. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged such a work sharing agreement creates a limited agency relationship between the parties. *See Griffin v. City of Dallas*, 26 F.3d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding limited designation of agency in work sharing agreement is sufficient to allow filing with EEOC to satisfy filing requirements with former Texas Commission on Human Rights).

You state in rendering performance under the work sharing agreement, the department is supervised by the EEOC's contract monitor, and the tasks the department performs and the manner in which it performs them are limited by the terms of the agreement and by EEOC rules and regulations. Under these circumstances, we agree with your assertion that under accepted agency principles, the department acts as the EEOC's agent in processing charges on behalf of the EEOC. *See Johnson v. Owens*, 629 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("An essential element of proof of agency is that the alleged principal has both the right to assign the agent's task and to control the means and details of the process by which the agent will accomplish the task."). We also agree that as an agent of the EEOC, the department is bound by section 2000e-5(b) of title 42 of the United States Code and may not make public charges of discrimination that it handles on the EEOC's behalf. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); *see also McMillan v. Computer Translations Sys. & Support, Inc.*, 66 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, orig. proceeding) (under principles of agency and contract law, fact that principal is bound can serve to bind agent as well).

We note the requestor is the attorney of record for the respondent in the EEOC claim at issue. In *Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associated Dry Goods Corporation*, 449 U.S. 590 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held the “public” to whom section 2000e-5(b) forbids disclosure of certain confidential information does not include the parties to the EEOC claim. *See* 449 U.S. at 598. Thus, the city may not withhold the submitted information from this requestor under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 2000e-5(b) of title 42 of the United States Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that (1) contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public.<sup>1</sup> *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976). In *Morales v. Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied), the court addressed the applicability of the common-law privacy doctrine to files of an investigation of allegations of sexual harassment. The investigation files in *Ellen* contained individual witness statements, an affidavit by the individual accused of the misconduct responding to the allegations, and conclusions of the board of inquiry that conducted the investigation. *Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d at 525. The court ordered the release of the affidavit of the person under investigation and the conclusions of the board of inquiry, stating that the public’s interest was sufficiently served by the disclosure of such documents. *Id.* In concluding, the *Ellen* court held “the public did not possess a legitimate interest in the identities of the individual witnesses, nor the details of their personal statements beyond what is contained in the documents that have been ordered released.” *Id.*

Thus, if there is an adequate summary of an investigation of alleged sexual harassment, the investigation summary must be released under *Ellen*, but the identities of the victims and witnesses of the alleged sexual harassment must be redacted, and their detailed statements must be withheld from disclosure. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 393 (1983), 339 (1982). However, when no adequate summary exists, detailed statements regarding the allegations must be released, but the identities of witnesses and victims must still be redacted from the statements. In either case, the identity of the individual accused of sexual harassment is not protected from public disclosure. We also note supervisors are generally not witnesses for purposes of *Ellen*, except where their statements appear in a non-supervisory context.

The submitted information includes information relating to allegations of sexual harassment. Upon review, we determine the submitted information does not contain an adequate summary of an investigation of the alleged sexual harassment. Because there is no adequate summary, the city must generally release any information pertaining to the sexual harassment allegations. However, the information at issue contains the identities of a victim of and

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<sup>1</sup>The Office of the Attorney General will raise mandatory exceptions on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

witnesses to the alleged sexual harassment. Accordingly, the city must withhold such information, which we have marked, under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy and the holding in *Ellen*. See *Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d at 525.

We also note the submitted information includes an e-mail address of a member of the public that is subject to section 552.137 of the Government Code. Section 552.137 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body,” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). Gov’t Code § 552.137(a)-(c). The e-mail address we have marked is not one of the types specifically excluded by section 552.137(c). See *id.* § 552.137(c). Accordingly, the city must withhold the e-mail address we have marked under section 552.137, unless the owner of the address affirmatively consents to its release. The remaining information must be released.

In summary, the city must withhold (1) the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy; and (2) the e-mail address we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owner affirmatively consents to its release. The remaining information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General’s Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mili Gosar", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Mili Gosar  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

MG/akg

Ref: ID# 575322

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)