



**KEN PAXTON**  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

This ruling has been modified by court action.  
The ruling and judgment can be viewed in PDF  
format below.



**KEN PAXTON**  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

August 14, 2015

Ms. Jenny Wells  
General Counsel  
Leander Independent School District  
P.O. Box 218  
Leander, Texas 78646

**The ruling you have requested has been amended as a result of litigation and has been attached to this document.**

OR2015-16865

Dear Ms. Wells:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 575373 (PIR #1333).

The Leander Independent School District (the "district") received a request for a specified investigation log. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.103, 552.107, 552.111, and 552.135 of the Government Code.<sup>1</sup> We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted information. We have also received and considered comments from the requestor. *See* Gov't Code § 552.304 (permitting interested third party to submit to attorney general reasons why requested information should or should not be released).

Section 552.103 of the Government Code provides in relevant part as follows:

- (a) Information is excepted from [required public disclosure] if it is information relating to litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party or to which an officer or

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<sup>1</sup>Although the district also raises Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5, we note the proper exception to raise when asserting the attorney work product privilege for information not subject to section 552.022 of the Government Code is section 552.111 of the Government Code. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 677 (2002), 676 at 6 (2002).

employee of the state or a political subdivision, as a consequence of the person's office or employment, is or may be a party.

...

(c) Information relating to litigation involving a governmental body or an officer or employee of a governmental body is excepted from disclosure under Subsection (a) only if the litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date that the requestor applies to the officer for public information for access to or duplication of the information.

Gov't Code § 552.103(a), (c). The governmental body has the burden of providing relevant facts and documents to show the section 552.103(a) exception is applicable in a particular situation. The test for meeting this burden is a showing that (1) litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the governmental body received the request for information and (2) the information at issue is related to that litigation. *Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found.*, 958 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, orig. proceeding); *Heard v. Houston Post Co.*, 684 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 551 at 4 (1990). The governmental body must meet both prongs of this test for information to be excepted from disclosure under section 552.103(a).

The question of whether litigation is reasonably anticipated must be determined on a case-by-case basis. *See* Open Records Decision No. 452 at 4 (1986). To demonstrate litigation is reasonably anticipated, the governmental body must furnish concrete evidence that litigation involving a specific matter is realistically contemplated and is more than mere conjecture. *Id.* Concrete evidence to support a claim that litigation is reasonably anticipated may include, for example, an attorney for a potential opposing party making a demand for payment and asserting an intent to sue if such payments are not made. Open Records Decision Nos. 555 at 3 (1990), 346 (1982). In addition, this office has concluded litigation was reasonably anticipated when the potential opposing party threatened to sue on several occasions and hired an attorney. *See* Open Records Decision No. 288 at 2 (1981). However, an individual publicly threatening to bring suit against a governmental body, but who does not actually take objective steps toward filing suit, is not concrete evidence that litigation is reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 331 at 1-2 (1982).

The district states it reasonably anticipated litigation when it received the request for information because the district "has engaged in" or "is actively involved in" settlement negotiations or formed confidential agreements with several individuals named in the submitted documentation. However, upon review, we find you have failed to identify any specific pending or reasonably anticipated litigation to which the submitted information is related. Thus, the district has failed to demonstrate how the submitted information is related to litigation that was pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the district received the

request for information. Consequently, the district may not withhold any portion of the submitted information under section 552.103(a) of the Government Code.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a *confidential* communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You indicate the submitted information consists of privileged communications an attorney of the district is prohibited from disclosing under the attorney-client privilege. However, upon review, we find you have not demonstrated the submitted information constitutes communications between privileged parties. *See* TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A)-(E). Accordingly, the district may not withhold the submitted information under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.

Section 552.111 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “[a]n interagency or intraagency memorandum or letter that would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.111. Section 552.111 encompasses the attorney work product privilege found in rule 192.5 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Open Records Decision No. 677 at 4-8 (2002); *see City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News*, 22 S.W.3d 351, 377 (Tex. 2000). Rule 192.5 defines work product as

- (1) material prepared or mental impressions developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or a party’s representatives, including the party’s attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees, or agents; or
- (2) a communication made in anticipation of litigation or for trial between a party and the party’s representatives or among a party’s representatives, including the party’s attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees or agents.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.5(a)(1)-(2). A governmental body seeking to withhold information under this exception bears the burden of demonstrating the information was created or developed for trial or in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or a party’s representative. *Id.*; ORD 677 at 6-8. In order for this office to conclude that the information was made or developed in anticipation of litigation, we must be satisfied that

- a) a reasonable person would have concluded from the totality of the circumstances . . . that there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue; and b) the party resisting discovery believed in good faith that there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue and [created or obtained the information] for the purpose of preparing for such litigation.

*Nat’l Tank Co. v. Brotherton*, 851 S.W.2d 193, 207 (Tex. 1993). A “substantial chance” of litigation does not mean a statistical probability, but rather “that litigation is more than merely an abstract possibility or unwarranted fear.” *Id.* at 204; ORD 677 at 7.

The district contends the information at issue consists of attorney work product. However, upon review, we find you have not demonstrated the submitted information consists of material prepared, mental impressions developed, or a communication made for trial or in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or a party’s representative. Accordingly, the district may not withhold any of the information at issue as attorney work product under section 552.111 of the Government Code.

Section 552.111 of the Government Code also excepts from disclosure “[a]n interagency or intraagency memorandum or letter that would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency[.]” *Id.* § 552.111. This exception encompasses the deliberative process

privilege. *See* Open Records Decision No. 615 at 2 (1993). The purpose of section 552.111 is to protect advice, opinion, and recommendation in the decisional process and to encourage open and frank discussion in the deliberative process. *See Austin v. City of San Antonio*, 630 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 538 at 1-2 (1990).

In Open Records Decision No. 615, we determined section 552.111 excepts from disclosure only those internal communications that consist of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting the policymaking processes of the governmental body. *See* ORD 615 at 5. A governmental body's policymaking functions do not encompass routine internal administrative or personnel matters, and disclosure of information about such matters will not inhibit free discussion of policy issues among agency personnel. *Id.*; *see also City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News*, 22 S.W.3d 351, 364 (Tex. 2000) (section 552.111 not applicable to personnel-related communications that did not involve policymaking). A governmental body's policymaking functions include administrative and personnel matters of broad scope that affect the governmental body's policy mission. *See* Open Records Decision No. 631 at 3 (1995). Further, section 552.111 does not protect facts and written observations of facts and events severable from advice, opinions, and recommendations. *Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Attorney Gen.*, 37 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); *see* ORD 615 at 5. But if factual information is so inextricably intertwined with material involving advice, opinion, or recommendation as to make severance of the factual data impractical, section 552.111 protects the factual information. *See* Open Records Decision No. 313 at 3 (1982).

You assert the submitted information consists of information that relates to "specific personnel information" used to "facilitate policy decisions made by the [district's] Human Resources department related to staff training, development, creation and implementation of [d]istrict-wide policy and procedures, identification of potential or threatened litigation, material prepared in anticipation of litigation, and management of ongoing issues that may be in various stages of settlement or negotiation." You further state the "factual information itself leads . . . directly to opinions, recommendations[,] and advice related to" the matters discussed above. However, upon review, we find you have not demonstrated how the submitted information, which is purely factual in nature, consists of advice, opinions, or recommendations about a policymaking decision. Accordingly, the district may not withhold any of the information at issue under the deliberative process privilege of section 552.111 of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses section 21.355 of the Education Code, which provides, "[a] document evaluating the performance of a teacher or administrator is confidential." *See* Educ. Code § 21.355(a). This office has interpreted section 21.355 to apply to any document that evaluates, as that term is commonly understood, the performance

of a teacher or an administrator. *See* Open Records Decision No. 643 (1996). We have determined for purposes of section 21.355, the term “teacher” means a person who is required to and does in fact hold a teaching certificate or permit under subchapter B of chapter 21 of the Education Code and who is engaged in the process of teaching, as that term is commonly defined, at the time of the evaluation. *See id.* at 4. We have determined that the word “administrator” in section 21.355 means a person who is required to and does in fact hold an administrator’s certificate under chapter 21 of the Education Code and is performing the functions of an administrator, as that term is commonly defined, at the time of the evaluation. *Id.* The Third Court of Appeals has concluded a written reprimand constitutes an evaluation for purposes of section 21.355, because “it reflects the principal’s judgment regarding [a teacher’s] actions, gives corrective direction, and provides for further review.” *See Abbott v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 212 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.).

The district argues portions of the submitted information consist of evaluations of district employees in their performances as teachers or administrators. However, upon review, we find you have not established any of the information at issue consists of “[a] document evaluating the performance of a teacher or administrator” as contemplated by section 21.355. *See* Educ. Code § 21.355(a). Accordingly, we conclude you have not established any of the information at issue is confidential under section 21.355, and the district may not withhold it under section 552.101 on that ground.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses section 261.201 of the Family Code, which provides, in part, the following:

(a) [T]he following information is confidential, is not subject to public release under [the Act], and may be disclosed only for purposes consistent with this code and applicable federal or state law or under rules adopted by an investigating agency:

- (1) a report of alleged or suspected abuse or neglect made under this chapter and the identity of the person making the report; and
- (2) except as otherwise provided in this section, the files, reports, records, communications, audiotapes, videotapes, and working papers used or developed in an investigation under this chapter or in providing services as a result of an investigation.

Fam. Code § 261.201(a); *see id.* §§ 101.003(a) (defining “child” for purposes of chapter 261), 261.001 (defining “abuse” and “neglect” for purposes of chapter 261 of the Family Code). You claim some of the submitted information is confidential under section 261.201. We note the district is not an agency authorized to conduct an investigation under chapter 261 of the Family Code. *See id.* § 261.103 (listing agencies that may conduct

child abuse investigations). You state the information at issue relates to “an employee that was the subject of an investigation by Child Protective Services [a department of DFPS].” However, you have not demonstrated the information at issue was produced to an agency authorized to conduct an investigation under chapter 261 of the Family Code. Accordingly, we conclude the information at issue does not consist of information used or developed in an investigation of alleged or suspected child abuse under chapter 261 of the Family Code. Accordingly, no portion of the information at issue is confidential under section 261.201 of the Family Code and it may not be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code on that basis.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses information protected by the common-law informer’s privilege, which has long been recognized by Texas courts. *See Aguilar v. State*, 444 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); *Hawthorne v. State*, 10 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928). The informer’s privilege protects the identities of persons who report activities over which the governmental body has criminal or quasi-criminal law enforcement authority, provided the subject of the report does not already know their identities. Open Records Decision Nos. 515 at 2-3 (1988), 434 at 1-2 (1986), 208 at 1-2 (1978). For the informer’s privilege to apply, the report must be of a violation of a criminal or civil statute. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 582 at (1990), 515 at 3-4. The privilege affords protection to individuals who report violations of statutes to criminal law enforcement agencies, as well as those who report violations of statutes with civil or criminal penalties to “administrative officials having a duty of inspection or of law enforcement within their particular spheres.” Open Records Decision No. 279 at 1-2 (1981) (citing 8 John H. Wigmore, *Evidence in Trials at Common Law*, § 2374, at 767 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)). However, witnesses who provide information in the course of an investigation but do not make a report of the violation are not informants for the purposes of the informer’s privilege. Upon review, we find the district has not demonstrated the information you seek to withhold identifies an informer for purposes of the common-law informer’s privilege. Therefore, the district may not withhold the information at issue under section 552.101 on the basis of the common-law informer’s privilege.

Section 552.135 of the Government Code provides in pertinent part:

(a) “Informer” means a student or former student or an employee or former employee of a school district who has furnished a report of another person’s or persons’ possible violation of criminal, civil, or regulatory law to the school district or the proper regulatory enforcement authority.

(b) An informer’s name or information that would substantially reveal the identity of an informer is excepted from [required public disclosure].

*Id.* § 552.135(a), (b). Because the legislature limited the protection of section 552.135 to the identity of a person who reports a possible violation of “law,” a school district that seeks to


withhold information under the exception must clearly identify to this office the specific civil, criminal, or regulatory law that is alleged to have been violated. *See id.* § 552.301(e)(1)(A). We note section 552.135 protects an informer's identity, but it does not generally encompass protection for witness statements. In this instance, you assert, and the documentation reflects, portions of the submitted information reveal the identities of individuals who have made a report of alleged violations of regulations against inappropriate student/teacher relationships; fraud; theft; and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Based on your representations and our review, we conclude the district must withhold the information we marked under section 552.135 of the Government Code.<sup>2</sup> However, we find you have not demonstrated how any of the remaining information at issue identifies an informer for purposes of section 552.135. Therefore, the district may not withhold any of the remaining information on that basis.

In summary, the district must withhold the information we marked under section 552.135 of the Government Code. The district must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Joseph Behnke  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

JB/som

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<sup>2</sup>As our ruling is dispositive for this information, we need not address your remaining argument against its disclosure.

Ref: ID# 575373

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)

Filed In The District Court  
of Travis County, Texas  
on 6/1/2016  
at SP M.  
Velva L. Pride, District Clerk

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-15-003679

LEANDER INDEPENDENT  
SCHOOL DISTRICT,  
*Plaintiff,*

v.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY  
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF  
TEXAS,  
*Defendant.*

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

98th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS


**FINAL JUDGMENT**

On May 24, 2016, a hearing was held on the parties' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Leander Independent School District and Defendant Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, appeared through counsel. This is a lawsuit under the Public Information Act, by which Plaintiff sought relief from a ruling of the Attorney General. The Court, having considered the testimony and documentary evidence, pleadings, and arguments of counsel enters the following declaration and orders.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECLARED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Leander ISD's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that the information at issue is not excepted from required public disclosure and must be released to the requestor.


This Order disposes of all claims between all parties and is a final judgment.

Signed this 1 day of June, 2016.

  
JUDGE PRESIDING



AGREED AS TO FORM:



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