



KEN PAXTON  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

April 20, 2016

Mr. Michael Shaunessy  
Counsel for Comal County Sheriff's Office  
McGinnis Lochridge  
600 Congress, Suite 1200  
Austin, Texas 78701

OR2016-08855

Dear Mr. Shaunessy:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 606649 (Comal County File# 16OR-012).

The Comal County Sheriff's Office (the "sheriff's office"), which you represent, received a request for all information pertaining to a specified incident. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.103 and 552.130 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.<sup>1</sup>

Initially, we note the sheriff's office has submitted some of the requested information, which we have marked, in a manner so obscured, we are unable to review it. The sheriff's office must submit information in a manner that enables this office to determine whether the information comes within the scope of an exception to disclosure. As this office cannot review the information at issue, we conclude you have failed to comply with the requirements of section 552.301 of the Government Code with respect to that information.

---

<sup>1</sup>We assume that the "representative sample" of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent that those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

*See* Gov't Code § 552.301(e)(1)(D). Under section 552.302 of the Government Code, a governmental body's failure to comply with section 552.301 results in the presumption the information is public and must be released, unless there is a compelling reason to withhold the information. *See id.* § 552.302; *Simmons v. Kuzmich*, 166 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); *Hancock v. State Bd. of Ins.*, 797 S.W.2d 379, 381-82 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ); Open Records Decision No. 319 (1982). Generally, a compelling reason to withhold information exists when the information is confidential by law or third party interests are at stake. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 630 at 3 (1994), 325 at 2 (1982). Section 552.130 of the Government Code can provide compelling reasons to overcome the presumption of openness; however, because this office is unable to review the information at issue, we have no basis to conclude the information is confidential by law.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, we have no choice but to order the sheriff's office to release that information. If the sheriff's office maintains a legible copy of the information at issue and believes any other information contained therein is confidential and may not lawfully be released, then the sheriff's office must challenge this ruling in court pursuant to section 552.324 of the Government Code. We will address your arguments for the remaining submitted information.

Section 552.103 of the Government Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Information is excepted from [required public disclosure] if it is information relating to litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party or to which an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision, as a consequence of the person's office or employment, is or may be a party.

...

(c) Information relating to litigation involving a governmental body or an officer or employee of a governmental body is excepted from disclosure under Subsection (a) only if the litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date that the requestor applies to the officer for public information for access to or duplication of the information.

Gov't Code § 552.103(a), (c). The governmental body has the burden of providing relevant facts and documents to show the section 552.103(a) exception is applicable in a particular situation. The test for meeting this burden is a showing that (1) litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the governmental body received the request for

---

<sup>2</sup>We note section 552.130(c) of the Government Code allows a governmental body to redact the information described in section 552.130(a) without the necessity of seeking a decision from the attorney general. *See* Gov't Code § 552.130(c). If a governmental body redacts such information, it must notify the requestor in accordance with section 552.130(e). *See id.* § 552.130(d), (e).

information and (2) the information at issue is related to that litigation. *Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found.*, 958 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, orig. proceeding); *Heard v. Houston Post Co.*, 684 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 551 at 4 (1990). The governmental body must meet both prongs of this test for information to be excepted from disclosure under section 552.103(a).

The question of whether litigation is reasonably anticipated must be determined on a case-by-case basis. *See* Open Records Decision No. 452 at 4 (1986). To demonstrate litigation is reasonably anticipated, the governmental body must furnish concrete evidence that litigation involving a specific matter is realistically contemplated and is more than mere conjecture. *Id.* Concrete evidence to support a claim that litigation is reasonably anticipated may include, for example, an attorney for a potential opposing party making a demand for payment and asserting an intent to sue if such payments are not made. Open Records Decision Nos. 555 at 3 (1990), 346 (1982). In addition, this office has concluded litigation was reasonably anticipated when the potential opposing party threatened to sue on several occasions and hired an attorney. *See* Open Records Decision No. 288 at 2 (1981). However, an individual publicly threatening to bring suit against a governmental body, but who does not actually take objective steps toward filing suit, is not concrete evidence that litigation is reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 331 at 1-2 (1982). Further, the fact that a potential opposing party has hired an attorney who makes a request for information does not establish litigation is reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 361 (1983).

You state the sheriff's office anticipates litigation because the requestor represents a personal injury law firm. However, upon review, we find you have failed to demonstrate any party had taken concrete steps toward filing litigation against the sheriff's office when it received this request for information. Therefore, the sheriff's office may not withhold the submitted information under section 552.103(a) of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision."<sup>3</sup> Gov't Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses laws that make criminal history record information ("CHRI") confidential. CHRI generated by the National Crime Information Center or by the Texas Crime Information Center is confidential under federal and state law. Title 28, part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs the release of CHRI that states obtain from the federal government or other states. Open Records Decision No. 565 at 7 (1990). The federal regulations allow each state to follow its individual law with respect to CHRI it generates. *Id.* Section 411.083 of the Government Code deems confidential CHRI

---

<sup>3</sup>The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

the Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) maintains, except DPS may disseminate this information as provided in chapter 411, subchapter E-1 or F of the Government Code. *See* Gov’t Code § 411.083. Sections 411.083(b)(1) and 411.089(a) authorize a criminal justice agency to obtain CHRI; however, a criminal justice agency may not release CHRI except to another criminal justice agency for a criminal justice purpose. *Id.* § 411.089(b)(1). Other entities specified in chapter 411 of the Government Code are entitled to obtain CHRI from DPS or another criminal justice agency; however, those entities may not release CHRI except as provided by chapter 411. *See generally id.* §§ 411.090-.127. Similarly, any CHRI obtained from DPS or any other criminal justice agency must be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with Government Code chapter 411. *See id.* § 411.082(2)(B) (term CHRI does not include driving record information). We note active warrant information or other information relating to an individual’s current involvement in the criminal justice system does not constitute criminal history information for purposes of section 552.101. *See id.* § 411.081(b). We further note records relating to routine traffic violations are not considered criminal history information. *Cf. id.* § 411.082(2)(B) (criminal history record information does not include driving record information). Upon review, we find the sheriff’s office must withhold the CHRI we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 411.083 of the Government Code and federal law.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Under the common-law right of privacy, an individual has a right to be free from the publicizing of private affairs in which the public has no legitimate concern. *Id.* at 682. In considering whether a public citizen’s date of birth is private, the Third Court of Appeals looked to the supreme court’s rationale in *Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas*, 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010). *Paxton v. City of Dallas*, No. 03-13-00546-CV, 2015 WL 3394061, at \*3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The supreme court concluded public employees’ dates of birth are private under section 552.102 of the Government Code because the employees’ privacy interest substantially outweighed the negligible public interest in disclosure.<sup>4</sup> *Texas Comptroller*, 354 S.W.3d at 347-48. Based on *Texas Comptroller*, the court of appeals concluded the privacy rights of public employees apply equally to public citizens, and thus, public citizens’ dates of birth are also protected by common-law privacy pursuant to section 552.101. *City of Dallas*, 2015 WL 3394061, at \*3. Additionally, this office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. *See* Open Records Decision No. 455 (1987). We note, however, “the right

---

<sup>4</sup>Section 552.102(a) excepts from disclosure “information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Gov’t Code § 552.102(a).

of privacy is purely personal,” that right “terminates upon the death of the person whose privacy is invaded.” *Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enters., Inc.*, 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also *Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp.*, 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (“action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977))); Attorney General Opinions JM-229 (1984) (“the right of privacy lapses upon death”), H-917 (1976) (“We are . . . of the opinion that the Texas courts would follow the almost uniform rule of other jurisdictions that the right of privacy lapses upon death.”); Open Records Decision No. 272 (1981) (“the right of privacy is personal and lapses upon death”). Thus, the sheriff’s office may not withhold information pertaining solely to the deceased individual under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. Thus, the sheriff’s office must withhold the dates of birth of living individuals, and the additional information we have marked, under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Section 552.130 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure information that relates to a motor vehicle operator’s license or driver’s license or a motor vehicle title or registration issued by a Texas agency, or an agency of another state or country. See Gov’t Code § 552.130(a)(1)-(2). We note section 552.130 is designed to protect the privacy of individuals, and the right to privacy expires at death. See *Moore*, 589 S.W.2d at 491; ORD 272 at 1. Thus, the sheriff’s office may not withhold the driver’s license information that pertains solely to a deceased individual under section 552.130. Upon review, we find the sheriff’s office must withhold the motor vehicle record information we have marked, as well as the motor vehicle information in the submitted audio and video recordings, under section 552.130 of the Government Code. However, none of the remaining information may be withheld under section 552.130 of the Government Code.

In summary, the sheriff’s office must release the obscured information we have marked. The sheriff’s office must withhold the CHRI we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 411.083 of the Government Code and federal law. The sheriff’s office must withhold the dates of birth of living individuals, and the additional information we have marked, under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. The sheriff’s office must withhold the motor vehicle record information we have marked, as well as the motor vehicle information within the submitted audio and video recordings, under section 552.130 of the Government Code. The remaining submitted information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ramsey Abarca". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Ramsey A. Abarca  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

RAA/dls

Ref: ID# 606649

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)