



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

June 27, 2016

Ms. Tamma Willis
Records Supervisor
McLennan County Sheriff's Office
901 Washington Avenue
Waco, Texas 76701

OR2016-14560

Dear Ms. Willis:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 616263.

The McLennan County Sheriff's Office (the "sheriff's office") received a request for all communications pertaining to a named individual and all communications sent amongst the sheriff's office and the named individual. You state you released some information. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.107 of the Government Code.¹ We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.²

Initially, the sheriff's office states some of the submitted information consists of educational records received from an educational institution that are subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ("FERPA"), section 1232g of title 20 of the United States

¹Although you also raise section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 552.107 of the Government Code, this office has concluded section 552.101 does not encompass other exceptions found in the Act. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 676 at 1-2 (2002), 575 at 2 (1990).

²We assume the "representative sample" of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

Code. The United States Department of Education Family Policy Compliance Office (the “DOE”) has informed this office that FERPA does not permit state and local educational authorities to disclose to this office, without parental or an adult student’s consent, unredacted, personally identifiable information contained in education records for the purpose of our review in the open records ruling process under the Act.³ Consequently, education records that are responsive to a request for information under the Act should not be submitted to this office in unredacted form, that is, in a form in which “personally identifiable information” is disclosed. *See* 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (defining “personally identifiable information”). We note the sheriff’s office is not an educational agency or institution for purposes of FERPA. *See* Open Records Decision No. 309 at 3 (1983) (City of Fort Worth not an “educational agency” within the meaning of FERPA). However, the sheriff’s office states the information at issue was obtained from an educational institution that created those documents. FERPA contains provisions that govern access to education records that were transferred by an educational agency or institution to a third party. To the extent the information at issue was obtained from an educational institution, so as to be governed by FERPA, we will not address the applicability of FERPA to this information, because our office is prohibited from reviewing education records to determine whether appropriate redactions have been made under FERPA. Such determinations under FERPA must be made by the educational authorities from which education records were obtained. Thus, the sheriff’s office should contact any educational institution from which the information was obtained, as well as the DOE, regarding the applicability of FERPA to this information. To the extent that the information at issue is not governed by FERPA, we will address your arguments against its disclosure.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. *See* Gov’t Code § 552.107(1). When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not

³A copy of this letter may be found on the Office of the Attorney General’s website: <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/og/20060725usdoe.pdf>.

demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a *confidential* communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You state Exhibit B consists of communications involving attorneys for the sheriff’s office, sheriff’s office employees, and McLennan County employees. You state these communications were made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the sheriff’s office. You state these communications were intended to be, and have remained, confidential. Based on your representations and our review, we find you have demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to Exhibit B. Accordingly, the sheriff’s office may withhold Exhibit B under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. You raise section 552.101 in conjunction with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) for portions of the submitted information. At the direction of Congress, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) promulgated regulations setting privacy standards for medical records, which HHS issued as the Federal Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information. *See* HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (Supp. IV 1998) (historical & statutory note); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. Pts. 160, 164 (“Privacy Rule”); *see also* Attorney General Opinion JC-0508 at 2 (2002). These standards govern the releasability of protected health information by a covered entity. *See* 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164. Under these standards, a covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information, excepted as provided by parts 160 and 164 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a).

This office has addressed the interplay of the Privacy Rule and the Act. Open Records Decision No. 681 (2004). In that decision, we noted section 164.512 of title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides a covered entity may use or disclose protected health information to the extent such use or disclosure is required by law and the use or disclosure complies with and is limited to the relevant requirements of such law. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(1). We further noted the Act “is a mandate in Texas law that compels Texas governmental bodies to disclose information to the public.” *See* ORD 681 at 8; *see also* Gov’t Code §§ 552.002, .003, .021. We therefore held the disclosures under the Act come within section 164.512(a). Consequently, the Privacy Rule does not make information confidential for the purpose of section 552.101 of the Government Code. *See Abbott v Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation*, 212 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.); ORD 681 at 9 (2004); *see also* Open Records Decision No. 478 (1987) (as general rule, statutory confidentiality requires express language making information confidential). Because the Privacy Rule does not make confidential information that is subject to disclosure under the Act, the sheriff’s office may not withhold any portion of the remaining information under section 552.101 in conjunction with HIPAA.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the Medical Practice Act (“MPA”), subtitle B of title 3 of the Occupations Code, which governs release of medical records. Section 159.002 of the MPA provides, in relevant part:

- (a) A communication between a physician and a patient, relative to or in connection with any professional services as a physician to the patient, is confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed except as provided by this chapter.
- (b) A record of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient by a physician that is created or maintained by a physician is confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed except as provided by this chapter.
- (c) A person who receives information from a confidential communication or record as described by this chapter, other than a person listed in Section 159.004 who is acting on the patient’s behalf, may not disclose the information except to the extent that disclosure is consistent with the authorized purposes for which the information was first obtained.

Occ. Code § 159.002(a)-(c). Information subject to the MPA includes both medical records and information obtained from those medical records. *See id.* §§ 159.002, .004. This office has concluded the protection afforded by section 159.002 extends only to records created by either a physician or someone under the supervision of a physician. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 487 (1987), 370 (1983), 343 (1982). We have further found when a file is created as a result of a hospital stay, all the documents in the file referring to diagnosis and

treatment constitute physician-patient communications or “[r]ecords of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient by a physician that are created or maintained by a physician.” Open Records Decision No. 546 (1990).

Upon review, we find portions of Exhibit C, which we marked, constitute records of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient by a physician that were created or are maintained by a physician and information obtained from a patient’s medical records. Accordingly, the sheriff’s office must withhold the marked information under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the MPA. However, we find you have not demonstrated any portion of the remaining information consists of medical records for purposes of the MPA. Accordingly, the sheriff’s office may not withhold any of the remaining information under section 552.101 on that basis.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. This office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. See Open Records Decision No. 455 (1987). Additionally, in Open Records Decision No. 393 (1983), this office concluded information that either identifies or tends to identify a victim of sexual assault or other sex-related offense must be withheld under common-law privacy. ORD 393 at 2; see Open Records Decision No. 339 (1982); see also *Morales v. Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d at 519 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied) (identity of witnesses to and victims of sexual harassment was highly intimate or embarrassing information and public did not have a legitimate interest in such information). In considering whether a public citizen’s date of birth is private, the Third Court of Appeals looked to the supreme court’s rationale in *Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas*, 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010). *Paxton v. City of Dallas*, No. 03-13-00546-CV, 2015 WL 3394061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The supreme court concluded public employees’ dates of birth are private under section 552.102 of the Government Code because the employees’ privacy interest substantially outweighed the negligible public interest in disclosure.⁴ *Texas Comptroller*, 354 S.W.3d at 347-48. Based on *Texas Comptroller*, the court of appeals concluded the privacy rights of public employees apply equally to public citizens, and thus, public citizens’ dates of birth are also protected by common-law privacy pursuant to section 552.101. *City of Dallas*, 2015 WL 3394061, at *3.

⁴Section 552.102(a) exempts from disclosure “information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Gov’t Code § 552.102(a).

In *Morales v. Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied), the court addressed the applicability of the common-law privacy doctrine to files of an investigation of allegations of sexual harassment. The investigation files in *Ellen* contained individual witness statements, an affidavit by the individual accused of the misconduct responding to the allegations, and conclusions of the board of inquiry that conducted the investigation. *Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d at 525. The court ordered the release of the affidavit of the person under investigation and the conclusions of the board of inquiry, stating the public's interest was sufficiently served by the disclosure of such documents. *Id.* In concluding, the *Ellen* court held "the public did not possess a legitimate interest in the identities of the individual witnesses, nor the details of their personal statements beyond what is contained in the documents that have been ordered released." *Id.* Thus, if there is an adequate summary of an investigation of alleged sexual harassment, the investigation summary must be released under *Ellen*, along with the statement of the accused. However, the identities of the victims and witnesses of the alleged sexual harassment must be redacted, and their detailed statements must be withheld from disclosure. *See* ORDs 393, 339. However, when no adequate summary exists, detailed statements regarding the allegations must be released, but the identities of victims and witnesses must still be redacted from the statements. In either case, the identity of the individual accused of sexual harassment is not protected from public disclosure. We also note supervisors are generally not witnesses for purposes of *Ellen*, except where their statements appear in a non-supervisory context.

Upon review, we find the information we marked in Exhibit C satisfies the standard articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation*. Therefore, the sheriff's office must withhold the information we marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. Additionally, we note Exhibit D relates to an investigation into alleged sexual harassment. However, we find no portion of Exhibit D constitutes an adequate summary of the investigation. Therefore, the sheriff's office must generally release Exhibit D. However, this information contains the identifying information of the alleged sexual harassment victims and witnesses, which we marked. Therefore, the sheriff's office must withhold the information we marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy and *Ellen*. *See* 840 S.W.2d at 525. However, we find the sheriff's office has failed to demonstrate the remaining information is highly intimate or embarrassing and of no legitimate public interest. Thus, the sheriff's office may not withhold the remaining information under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Some of the remaining information is subject to section 552.117 of the Government Code.⁵ Section 552.117(a)(2) of the Government Code excepts from public disclosure the home

⁵The Office of the Attorney General will raise mandatory exceptions on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

address, home telephone number, emergency contact information, and social security number of a peace officer, as well as information that reveals whether the peace officer has family members, regardless of whether the peace officer complies with sections 552.024 and 552.1175 of the Government Code. *See* Gov't Code § 552.117(a)(2). Section 552.117(a)(2) applies to peace officers as defined by article 2.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the sheriff's office must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.117(a)(2) of the Government Code.⁶

Section 552.1175 of the Government Code provides in part:

(a) This section applies only to:

(1) peace officers as defined by Article 2.12, Code of Criminal Procedure[.]

(b) Information that relates to the home address, home telephone number, emergency contact information, date of birth, or social security number of an individual to whom this section applies, or that reveals whether the individual has family members is confidential and may not be disclosed to the public under this chapter if the individual to whom the information relates:

(1) chooses to restrict public access to the information; and

(2) notifies the governmental body of the individual's choice on a form provided by the governmental body, accompanied by evidence of the individual's status.

Id. § 552.1175(a)(1), (b). We note section 552.1175 is also applicable to personal cellular telephone numbers, provided the cellular telephone service is not paid for by a governmental body. *See* Open Records Decision No. 506 at 5-6 (1988) (section 552.117 not applicable to cellular telephone numbers paid for by governmental body and intended for official use). Some of the remaining information, which we marked, relates to an officer of the sheriff's office but the information is not held by the sheriff's office in an employment capacity. Accordingly, to the extent the officer at issue elects to restrict access to the marked information in accordance with section 552.1175(b), the sheriff's office must withhold the marked information pertaining to that officer under section 552.1175 of the Government Code; however, the marked cellular telephone number may be withheld only if a governmental body does not pay for the cellular telephone service. Conversely, if the officer

⁶We note a governmental body may withhold a peace officer's home address and telephone number, personal cellular telephone and pager numbers, social security number, and family member information under section 552.117(a)(2) without requesting a decision from this office. *See* ORD 670; Gov't Code § 552.147(b).

at issue does not elect to restrict access to the information in accordance with section 552.1175(b), the marked information pertaining to that officer may not be withheld under section 552.1175.

We note the remaining information contains e-mail addresses that are subject to section 552.137 of the Government Code. Section 552.137 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). *See* Gov’t Code § 552.137(a)-(c). The e-mail addresses at issue are not excluded by subsection (c). Therefore, the sheriff’s office must withhold the personal e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owners affirmatively consent to their public disclosure.⁷

In summary, the sheriff’s office may withhold Exhibit B under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. The sheriff’s office must withhold the marked information under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the MPA. The sheriff’s office must withhold the information we marked within Exhibit C under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. The sheriff’s office must withhold the information we marked in Exhibit D under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy and *Ellen*. The sheriff’s office must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.117(a)(2) of the Government Code. To the extent the officer at issue elects to restrict access to the marked information in accordance with section 552.1175(b), the sheriff’s office must withhold the marked information pertaining to that officer under section 552.1175 of the Government Code; however, the marked cellular telephone number may be withheld only if a governmental body does not pay for the cellular telephone service. The sheriff’s office must withhold the personal e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owners affirmatively consent to their public disclosure. The sheriff’s office must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

⁷We note Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009) is a previous determination to all governmental bodies authorizing them to withhold certain information, including an e-mail address of a member of the public under section 552.137 of the Government Code, without the necessity of requesting an attorney general decision.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Meagan J. Conway', with a large, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Meagan J. Conway
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

MJC/akg

Ref: ID# 616263

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)