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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

July 15, 2016

Ms. Lauren Downey
Assistant Attorney General
Public Information Coordinator
General Counsel Division
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

OR2016-16036

Dear Ms. Downey:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 619025 (PIR No. 16-44059).

The Office of the Attorney General (the "OAG") received a request for e-mails sent to or from a named OAG employee during a specified time period. The OAG states it released some information. The OAG claims some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.107, and 552.111 of the Government Code. We have considered the claimed exceptions and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.¹

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. *See id.* § 552.107(1). When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. *See* Open Records

¹We assume the representative sample of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent that those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. *See* TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *See In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. *See* TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Finally, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a *confidential* communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *See Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

The OAG states the information at issue consists of communications between OAG attorneys, OAG staff, and OAG Executive Management regarding various legal issues. The OAG states the communications were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the State of Texas. Further, the OAG states these communications were not intended to be disclosed and have not been disclosed to non-privileged parties. Upon review, we find the OAG has demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the information at issue. Thus, the OAG may withhold the information it marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.

Section 552.111 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “[a]n interagency or intraagency memorandum or letter that would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.111. This exception encompasses the deliberative process privilege. *See Open Records Decision No. 615 at 2* (1993). The purpose of section 552.111 is to protect advice, opinion, and recommendation in the decisional process

and to encourage open and frank discussion in the deliberative process. *See Austin v. City of San Antonio*, 630 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 538 at 1-2 (1990).

In Open Records Decision No. 615, we determined section 552.111 excepts from disclosure only those internal communications that consist of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting the policymaking processes of the governmental body. *See* ORD 615 at 5. A governmental body's policymaking functions do not encompass routine internal administrative or personnel matters, and disclosure of information about such matters will not inhibit free discussion of policy issues among agency personnel. *Id.*; *see also City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News*, 22 S.W.3d 351, 364 (Tex. 2000) (section 552.111 not applicable to personnel-related communications that did not involve policymaking). A governmental body's policymaking functions include administrative and personnel matters of broad scope that affect the governmental body's policy mission. *See* Open Records Decision No. 631 at 3 (1995). Further, section 552.111 does not protect facts and written observations of facts and events severable from advice, opinions, and recommendations. *Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Attorney Gen.*, 37 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); *see* ORD 615 at 5. But if factual information is so inextricably intertwined with material involving advice, opinion, or recommendation as to make severance of the factual data impractical, section 552.111 protects the factual information. *See* Open Records Decision No. 313 at 3 (1982).

The OAG asserts the information at issue consists of communications between members of the OAG's Executive Administration and the OAG's Human Resources Division discussing issues impacting the OAG. The OAG further asserts this information reflects the advice, opinions, and recommendations of OAG policymakers. Upon review, we find the OAG has demonstrated the information at issue consists of advice, opinions, or recommendations on policymaking matters of the OAG. Therefore, the OAG may withhold the information it marked under section 552.111 of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered highly intimate or embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. Additionally, this office has found personal financial information not relating to the financial transaction between an individual and a governmental body is generally highly intimate or embarrassing. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 (1992), 545 (1990) (deferred compensation information, participation in voluntary investment program, election of

optional insurance coverage, mortgage payments, assets, bills, and credit history). This office has found financial information relating only to an individual ordinarily satisfies the first requirement of the test for common-law privacy. See ORDs 600 (designation of beneficiary of employee's retirement benefits, direct deposit authorization, and forms allowing employee to allocate pretax compensation to group insurance, health care or dependent care), 523 (1989). However, information concerning financial transactions between an employee and a public employer is generally of legitimate public interest. ORD 545.

In *Morales v. Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied), the court addressed the applicability of the common-law privacy doctrine to files of an investigation of allegations of sexual harassment. The investigation files in *Ellen* contained individual witness statements, an affidavit by the individual accused of the misconduct responding to the allegations, and conclusions of the board of inquiry that conducted the investigation. *Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d at 525. The court ordered the release of the affidavit of the person under investigation and the conclusions of the board of inquiry, stating the public's interest was sufficiently served by the disclosure of such documents. *Id.* In concluding, the *Ellen* court held "the public did not possess a legitimate interest in the identities of the individual witnesses, nor the details of their personal statements beyond what is contained in the documents that have been ordered released." *Id.* Thus, if there is an adequate summary of an investigation of alleged sexual harassment, the investigation summary must be released under *Ellen*, along with the statement of the accused. However, the identities of the victims and witnesses of the alleged sexual harassment must be redacted, and their detailed statements must be withheld from disclosure. See Open Records Decision Nos. 393 (1983), 339 (1982). However, when no adequate summary exists, detailed statements regarding the allegations must be released, but the identities of victims and witnesses must still be redacted from the statements. In either case, the identity of the individual accused of sexual harassment is not protected from public disclosure. We also note supervisors are generally not witnesses for purposes of *Ellen*, except where their statements appear in a non-supervisory context.


In this instance, some of the remaining information is related to a sexual harassment investigation and does not include an adequate summary of an investigation. Therefore, the OAG must generally release the information pertaining to the investigation. However, this information contains the identity of the alleged sexual harassment victim. Therefore, the OAG must withhold the identifying information of the alleged victim, which the OAG marked, under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy and *Ellen*. See 840 S.W.2d at 525. However, we find none of the remaining information the OAG marked is highly intimate or embarrassing information and of no legitimate public interest, and it may not be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

In summary, the OAG may withhold the information it marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code and the information it marked under section 552.111 of the Government Code. The OAG must withhold the identifying information of the alleged sexual harassment victim, which the OAG marked, under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy and *Ellen*. The OAG must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Paige Thompson
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

PT/dls

Ref: ID# 619025

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)