



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

July 21, 2016

Ms. Jenny Wells
General Counsel
Leander Independent School District
P.O. Box 218
Leander, Texas 78646

OR2016-16432

Dear Ms. Wells:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 619511 (ORR# 1608).

The Leander Independent School District (the "district") received a request for (1) the training records for six named individuals; (2) any investigation records concerning one of the district's high schools on a specified date; (3) the district's employee and emergency policies; (4) any information detailing calls from the district to law enforcement agencies during a specified time period; and (5) all security videos for one of the district's high schools on a specified date.¹ You inform us you do not have information responsive to category four of the request.² You state you have released information responsive to categories one and

¹You state, and provide documentation showing, the district sought and received clarification of the request for information. See Gov't Code § 552.222(b) (stating governmental body may communicate with requestor for purpose of clarifying or narrowing request for information); see also *City of Dallas v. Abbott*, 304 S. W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (holding that when a governmental entity, acting in good faith, requests clarification or narrowing of an unclear or overbroad request for information, the ten-day period to request an attorney general ruling is measured from the date the request is clarified or narrowed).

²The Act does not require a governmental body to release information that did not exist when a request for information was received or to prepare new information in response to a request. See *Econ. Opportunities Dev. Corp. v. Bustamante*, 562 S.W.2d 266, 267-68 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1978, writ dism'd); Open Records Decision Nos. 605 at 2 (1992), 452 at 3 (1986), 362 at 2 (1983).

three of the request, and will release information responsive to category five of the request. You also state you redacted information pursuant to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a).³ You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.102, and 552.107 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body.

³The United States Department of Education Family Policy Compliance Office (the “DOE”) has informed this office FERPA does not permit state and local educational authorities to disclose to this office, without parental or an adult student’s consent, unredacted, personally identifiable information contained in education records for the purpose of our review in the open records ruling process under the Act. The DOE has determined FERPA determinations must be made by the educational authority in possession of the educational records. We have posted a copy of the letter from the DOE on the Attorney General’s website at <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/og/20060725usdoe.pdf>.

See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You claim some of the submitted information consists of communications between district employees and legal counsel for the district. You state these communications were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the district, and were intended to be confidential and have remained confidential. Based on your representations and our review, we find you have demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the information at issue. Thus, the district may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.⁴

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses other statutes, such as section 21.355 of the Education Code, which provides that “[a] document evaluating the performance of a teacher or administrator is confidential.” Educ. Code § 21.355(a). This office has interpreted section 21.355 to apply to any document that evaluates, as that term is commonly understood, the performance of a teacher or an administrator. *See* Open Records Decision No. 643 (1996). Additionally, a court has concluded that a written reprimand constitutes an evaluation for purposes of section 21.355, as it “reflects the principal’s judgment regarding [a teacher’s] actions, gives corrective direction, and provides for further review.” *Abbott v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 212 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). In Open Records Decision No. 643, we concluded that a “teacher” for purposes of section 21.355 means a person who (1) is required to and does in fact hold a certificate or permit required under chapter 21 of the Education Code, and (2) is teaching at the time of his or her evaluation. *See* ORD 643.

You assert the remaining information is confidential under section 21.355. However, upon review, we find you have not established any of the information at issue consists of “[a] document evaluating the performance of a teacher or administrator” as contemplated by section 21.355. *See* Educ. Code § 21.355(a). Accordingly, we conclude you have not established the remaining information is confidential under section 21.355 of the Education Code and the district may not withhold it under section 552.101 of the Government Code on that ground.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrines of constitutional and common-law privacy. Constitutional privacy consists of two interrelated types of privacy: (1) the right to make certain kinds of decisions independently and (2) an individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Open Records Decision No. 455 at 4 (1987). The first type protects an individual’s autonomy within “zones of privacy” which include matters related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child

⁴As our ruling is dispositive, we need not consider your remaining arguments against disclosure of this information.

rearing and education. *Id.* The second type of constitutional privacy requires a balancing between the individual's privacy interests and the public's need to know information of public concern. *Id.* The scope of information protected is narrower than that under the common law doctrine of privacy; the information must concern the "most intimate aspects of human affairs." *Id.* at 5 (quoting *Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Texas*, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985)).

Common-law privacy protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683.

You assert the remaining information is protected under constitutional and common-law privacy. Upon review, however, we find you have not demonstrated the remaining information falls within the zones of privacy or otherwise implicates an individual's privacy interests for the purposes of constitutional privacy. We also find you have failed to demonstrate the remaining information is highly intimate or embarrassing and not of legitimate public concern. We therefore conclude the district may not withhold the remaining information under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with constitutional or common-law privacy.

Section 552.102(a) of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Gov't Code § 552.102(a). We understand you to assert the privacy analysis under section 552.102(a) is the same as the common-law privacy test under section 552.101, which is discussed above. *See Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 685. In *Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, Inc.*, 652 S.W.2d 546, 549-51 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court of appeals ruled the privacy test under section 552.102(a) is the same as the *Industrial Foundation* privacy test. *See Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 685. However, the Texas Supreme Court has expressly disagreed with *Hubert's* interpretation of section 552.102(a), and held the privacy standard under section 552.102(a) differs from the *Industrial Foundation* test under section 552.101. *See Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen. of Tex.*, 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010). The supreme court also considered the applicability of section 552.102(a) and held it excepts from disclosure the dates of birth of state employees in the payroll database of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. *See id.* at 348. Upon review, we find you have failed to demonstrate the applicability of section 552.102(a) to the remaining information, and the district may not withhold it on this basis.

In summary, the district may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. The remaining information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Cole Hutchison". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "C".

Cole Hutchison
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

CH/bhf

Ref: ID# 619511

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)